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Abstract
My dissertation evaluates both own and spillover effects of a conditional cash trans-
fer program targeting young girls. The first chapter evaluates the effects of an ongoing
conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in India targeting young girls that provides
incentives in the form of deferred cash payments, with eligibility at birth and the largest
payment coming at age 21. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I exploit varia-
tion in exposure to LLY by birth cohort, state, and birth order to estimate the causal
impact of the program on childrens health and educational outcomes, as well as the fer-
tility behavior of parents. I find that the program significantly increased the likelihood
of registering the births of daughters. However, the sex ratio at birth does not change,
suggesting no change in female mortality. I find evidence of families having children
faster and in turn reducing the birth spacing. However, parents are moving toward
lower eventual family sizes as I find an increase in the likelihood of parents adopting
sterilization. Finally, the results using math and reading test score data show some
evidence of improvement in the education outcomes of daughters. Overall, I find that a
financial incentive program plays a limited role in affecting the well-being of girls.
The second chapter paper evaluates the spill-over effects of an ongoing conditional
cash transfer (CCT) program in India on the ineligible older siblings living in the same
households as the eligible beneficiary. Using difference-in-differences framework, I exploit
variation in exposure to LLY by birth cohort, state, and birth order to estimate the
spillover effect of the program on the ineligible older sibling’s educational outcomes. I
find that the program does not have any effect on the schooling outcomes of the ineligible
siblings. I also find negative effect on the math and reading skills of the ineligible siblings
of treated children relative to the children in families that received no treatment. The
evidence suggests that this effect operates through the reallocation of resources away
from the ineligible sibling towards the eligible sibling.
iv
Acknowledgements
I express my sincere gratitude to my advisors and mentors, Dr. Aimee Chin and
Dr. Willa Friedman, for their continued support, and guidance. I am grateful to Dr.
Fan Wang for his insightful comments and encouragement. This project could not have
been completed without their research expertise and patient supervision, all throughout
my Ph.D. completion. Their incredible sense of dedication towards work and life has
been a source of inspiration. The joy and enthusiasm they have for research is almost
contagious and motivating, something that kept me going in the PhD pursuit and more
so during the tough times.
I am thankful to all my colleagues, particularly Ashmita, Amrita, Somdeep, Max,
Vinh, Sharon, Sergiy, Tung, for being wonderful colleagues and friends. I also thank my
dear friends Gautham, Deepthi, Ankita, Deepanwita, and Suchi, for being an immense
source of support and being a family away from home.
Finally, I could not have completed work on this dissertation without the continuous
and unconditional support of my parents, Mr.Sudhir Kumar Jain and Mrs.Alka Jain who
are not only my role models but also my pillars of strength in every walk of life. I am what
I am today because of them and owe my everything to them. I also thank my brother
and sister Siddharth, and Aashi, to them I express my deepest gratitude. Together, all
four of them are my biggest strengths. I am thankful to both Sonal and Sonika for being
there during the ups and downs of my life, always. It was my family’s unconditional
love, encouragement and their belief in my capabilities, that I could complete work on
this study. Thank you.
v
to Papa
vi
Contents
1 Effects of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program Targeting Young Girls:
Evidence from India 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Program Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.1 Registered Births Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.2 Female Share and Fertility Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.3 Schooling and Cognitive Testing Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5 Identification Strategy and Estimating Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5.1 Difference-in-Differences Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5.2 Triple Difference-in-Differences Strategy (DDD) . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.6.1 Effects on Sex Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.6.2 Effects on Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.6.3 Effect on Schooling and Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.7 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.9 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.10 Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
vii
1.11 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2 Spillover Effects of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Ineligibles:
Evidence from India 60
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.2 Program Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3 Data and Identification Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.3.2 Estimating Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.6 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.7 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A Data Appendix 98
A.1 Civil Registration System Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A.2 India Human Development Survey, 2011-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A.3 Annual Status of Education Report, 2009-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
viii
List of Figures
1.1 Cohort-specific Effects: Female Share in Registered Births Us-
ing Official State Panel Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.2 Female Share in Registered Births . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.3 Cohort-specific Effects: Female Share at Birth using Household
Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.4 Cohort-specific Effects: Female Share at Birth by Birth Order
using Household Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1 Cohort-specific Effects: Highest Grade Completed by the Ineli-
gible First Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.2 Cohort-specific Effects: Likelihood of Ever Enrolled by the In-
eligible First Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.3 Cohort-specific Effects: Likelihood of Currently Enrolled by the
Ineligible First Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.4 Cohort-specific Effects: Current Grade of the Ineligible First
Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.5 Cohort-specific Effects: Math Score of the Ineligible First Born 83
2.6 Cohort-specific Effects: Read Score of the Ineligible First Born 84
ix
List of Tables
1.1 Incentive Structure of Ladli Laxmi Yojana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.2 Summary Statistics of Key Variables Using Official State Panel
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.3 Summary Statistics of Key Variables Using Household Survey
Data (Indian Human Development Survey) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.4 Summary Statistics of Key Schooling Variables Using Household
Survey Data (Annual Status of Education Report) . . . . . . . . 42
1.5 Effect on Female Share and Sex Ratio Using Official State Panel
Data from Civil Registration System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.6 Effect on Female Share at Birth and at Older Ages using House-
hold Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.7 Effect on Total Number of Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.8 Effect on Total Number of Children by Gender of the First Two
Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.9 Effect on Sterilization by the Total Number of Children . . . . . 47
1.10 Likelihood of being sterilized after the policy, by gender of the
first two children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.11 Effect on Birth Spacing between the first and second child . . . 49
1.12 Effect on Schooling Outcomes for Females Aged 5-8 Years . . . . 50
1.13 Effect on Math Scores of Females Aged 5-8 Years . . . . . . . . . 51
x
1.14 Effect on Read Scores of Females Aged 5-8 Years . . . . . . . . . 52
A1 Impact of the Program on Birth Registration Using State Panel
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A2 Robustness Check by Dropping Comparison States One by One 54
A3 Effect on Total Number of Children, Women Aged 20-40 . . . . 55
A4 Effect on Sterilization by Number of Children, women aged 20-40 56
A5 Effect on Total Number of Children with state specific women’s
cohort trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A6 Effect on Sterilization by Number of Children, with state specific
women’s cohort trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A7 Placebo Test: Reassign intervention to alternate age groups . . 59
2.1 Summary statistics of key variables using ASER data . . . . . . . 85
2.2 Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older sister . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.3 Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older brother . . . . . . . . . 87
2.4 Math test scores of the ineligible older sister . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.5 Math test scores of the ineligible older brother . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.6 Read test scores of the ineligible older sister . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.7 Read test scores of the ineligible older brother . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.8 Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older sister, aged 5-12 . . . 92
2.9 Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older brother, aged 5-12 . . 92
2.10 Math test scores of the ineligible older sister, aged 5-12 . . . . . 93
2.11 Math test scores of the ineligible older brother, aged 5-12 . . . . 93
2.12 Read test scores of the ineligible older sister, aged 5-12 . . . . . 94
2.13 Read test scores of the ineligible older brother, aged 5-12 . . . . 94
A1 Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older sister . . . . . . . . . . 95
A2 Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older brother . . . . . . . . . 95
A3 Math test scores of the ineligible older sister . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
xi
A4 Math test scores of the ineligible older brother . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A5 Read test scores of the ineligible older sister . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A6 Read test scores of the ineligible older brother . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A1 Variable Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A2 Variable Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A3 Variable Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
xii
Chapter 1
Effects of a Conditional Cash
Transfer Program Targeting Young
Girls: Evidence from India
1.1 Introduction
India has been struggling with a widening gender gap in most socio-economic indicators
and the federal and state governments are making efforts to bridge these gaps. Pro-
grams and policies have been introduced with the goal of improving the status of girls,
particularly in terms of infant survival, health, and education. The government of Mad-
hya Pradesh (MP), one of the poorest states in India, introduced such a program to
empower young girls.1 The program, called Ladli Laxmi Yojana (LLY), was launched
and announced in 2007 and is the first conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in the
state.
Beginning with Progresa in Mexico, CCT programs have been widely used to in-
crease school enrollment and improve health outcomes of poor children. CCT programs
1Government of India:http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2001/rjun2001/20062001/r200620011.html
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typically target school-aged children in poor households. Eligible families then receive
cash payments conditional on children’s school attendance and (or) regular health check-
ups. In brief, these programs induce the poor to invest in human capital development of
their children without constraining their budget allocations. Earlier literature (Schultz,
2001; Skoufias and di Maro, 2006; Behrman and Parker, 2011) shows evidence of mostly
positive impacts of CCT programs on school-aged children. These programs have been
shown to have positive short-run effects on poverty and long-run effects on human capital
development.
Although, there is a large literature of studies evaluating the conditional cash trans-
fer (CCT) programs, analysis of this particular program is of interest because it differs
in design from traditional CCT programs like Progresa, on several dimensions. First,
the program covers only first or second born girls, and from the time of birth. This
is important in terms of addressing the issues of infant mortality and prenatal sex se-
lective abortions. Second, the payments are deferred. They are made in installments
starting from enrollment in grade sixth,followed by payments made at meeting eventual
schooling targets, and the biggest payment comes at age 21. This raises the issue of
how households with liquidity constraints may respond to the program . The financial
incentives consist of a longterm savings bond redeemable on the daughters 21st birth-
day conditional on her staying unmarried until the age of 18 and completing school level
education. Additionally, the parents (either or both) have to adopt sterilization at the
time of enrolling their second (birth order) daughter. These dimensions of variability in
the design allows me to exploit variation by birth cohort, state, and birth order, which
was not possible in previous studies.
This paper is the first to provide evidence on the effects of Ladli Laxmi Yojana in
India. I assess the impact of LLY on improving the skewed sex ratio, changing family
size and composition, and education outcomes of girls. I estimate the intent-to-treat
program effects on sex ratio among living children, fertility preferences, and sterilization.
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In order to understand how the parental investments have changed, I look at the effect
of the program on eligible daughters health and schooling. Using the official state panel
(Civil Registration System Data) and individual level data from nationally representative
household surveys (India Human Development Survey and Annual Status of Education
of Education Report), I exploit variation in exposure across birth years, states, and birth
order to estimate the effects of LLY. Employing a difference-in-differences framework,
I compare eligible female children in Madhya Pradesh to their ineligible counterparts
in MP and five other similar states. I find that the Ladli Laxmi Yojana had a positive
effect on female registration at the time of birth, but find no significant effect on sex ratio
at birth or at later-life survival. There is an increase in the number of parents getting
sterilized after the program, but surprisingly not after the second daughter, as designed
under the policy. However, there is limited evidence of parents increasing investments
in daughters health and education in the short and medium term, as a result of the
program.
The main challenge for identification of this program’s impact is that it was launched
at the same time across the entire state of Madhya Pradesh. Also, the launch of the
scheme was at a time when Madhya Pradesh was experiencing high growth, and plausibly
increasing rates of return to education as a result. Thus, changes in girls’ health and
education outcomes during this period, could simply be because of the high growth in
the state.
I address this concern by using variation in the composition of eligible children as
well as the state and the year of birth to estimate the effects of the program. Follow-
ing the estimation in Duflo (2001), I treat older cohorts who were not exposed to the
program when they were born as the comparison group and younger cohorts who were
exposed to the program in Madhya Pradesh as the treated group. Then use the other
five states, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttarakhand as comparison
states. Finally, I add third and later born children, who were ineligible for the program,
3
as another comparison group.
The key dependent variables of interest are sex ratio, family size compositions, par-
ents’ sterilization, and schooling outcomes. First, I employ a difference-in-differences
(DID) estimation by comparing these outcomes across first and second born girls in
treated and untreated cohorts in Madhya Pradesh and comparison states. However, the
difference-in-differences estimate will only give the causal impact of the policy, as long
as the parallel trends assumption holds. Since I reject the parallel trends assumption,
I employ a triple difference (DDD) approach to estimate the effects of the program. In
addition, using difference-in-differences, the threats of omitted variable concerns still
remain, including economic growth and changes in investments in school and hospital
quality. The triple difference framework help address most of these issues. Therefore, I
compare the changes in outcomes of first and second born girls to the changes in out-
comes of third and later born girls. Given that third and later born children were not
eligible to participate in the program, I use them as a comparison group to control for
possible omitted variables at the state-year level.2 Moreover, most of the third born
children in the comparison group are not actually in families where the first and second
born daughters are eligible.3. To the extent that there are state-specific shifts in policies,
programs or spending for health and education, the higher birth order children will help
control for these state-specific time effects. For example, third born children born in
2006 and 2007 cohorts will certainly not be in families that would have been eligible for
the policy, i.e., those with first or second born girls in 2006 or later. Therefore, the third
born girls are from the same birth cohorts as the first and second born girls, but are
never eligible either before or after the policy because of their birth order. Therefore,
I compare the DID estimate with the estimate for the third and higher birth ordered
2Even though the program affects the family size, my results on changes in family size show that
most people continue to have three children. This makes using the third and later born children as a
valid comparison group.
3Given that I am studying the effects up to year 2011-12 and up to 2009, five and three years after
the program, respectively for sex ratio and schooling outcomes
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females in treated and control states. This triple difference is the preferred estimate of
program impact on sex ratio and schooling outcomes.
My main findings are as follows: First, I find no evidence of a change in either
the sex ratio at birth or girls’ later-life survival. However, registered births for girls
increase significantly. This seems to be a response to the program condition of registering
the daughter within the first year of birth. This led to an increase in sex ratio of
registered birth by almost 2%, enough to eliminate the imbalance in sex ratio.4 I find
that the likelihood of parents getting sterilized goes up by 8 percentage points, and by
15 percentage points among parents with eligible children. The response towards the
adoption of sterilization and smaller family sizes is driven by the non-BPL households.5
I also find a positive effect on the schooling outcomes of eligible girls, and also an
improvement in their math and reading skills. It is useful to note that although the
girls are still quite young at the time of measurement, I already find evidence of an
improvement in their education outcomes, both in terms of schooling and test scores.
Although LLY was implemented in only one Indian state, it is representative of a set
of more recent programs introduced in other states along several dimensions. Since, the
program is being touted as one of the most successful programs to save and empower
women in the state, other states are also emulating and introducing such programs.
Therefore, it is important to understand the effects of a financial incentive program
with enrollment at birth but delayed future payout. Furthermore, understanding its
strengths and weaknesses, as highlighted by my analyses, can help improve the design
of programs with similar socio-economics characteristics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related litera-
ture; section 3 describes the program; section 4 describes the data; section 5 discusses
estimating equations, and identification strategy; section 6 presents the main results;
4The natural rate of sex ratio is 105 males per 100 females.
http : //www.searo.who.int/entity/health situation trends/data/chi/sex− ratio/en/
5BPL are the Below Poverty Line households. The government issues a BPL card to families whose
income falls below the poverty line.
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section 7 shows robustness checks and section 8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Evaluation of most CCT programs in South America and some South Asian countries
show that these programs effectively increase poor households’ investments in the de-
velopment of their children’s human capital. There is a vast literature examining the
effects of CCT programs on children’s health and education outcomes (Skoufias et. al,
1999; Skoufias, Davis, and De La Vega, 2001; Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd, 2005; de
Janvry et. al, 2006; Chaudhury and Parajuli, 2010; Burde and Leigh, 2013). Most of
these studies find a positive effective of financial incentive programs on improving health
and education outcomes of poor children.
Over the years, the issue of Indias missing women (Sen, 1990), has attracted a lot
of attention amongst policymakers. Studies claim that about half a million girls go
”missing” every year in India (Jha et al 2006). While the exact figure continues to be
a debated issue, it is clear India is still struggling with the problem of skewed sex ratio
and gender gaps. The sex ratio at birth has declined sharply and is still far from the
natural sex ratio at birth of 952 girls to 1,000 boys. A substantial proportion of the
decline in the female share may be attributed to discrimination against girls in the form
of non-registration of female birth, sex selection, infanticide and parental neglect.
Indian federal and state governments have introduced several financial incentive pro-
grams to improve female survival, and health and education investments in girls. How-
ever, there is limited evidence on the effectiveness and causal effect of these financial
incentive programs on change in parental investments and attitudes towards their daugh-
ters. Anukriti (2017) evaluates one such financial incentive program in India targeted at
reducing fertility and improving sex ratio. She finds that the program, called Devirupak,
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increases the probability of couples having just one son. Moreover, the program does not
change parents attitudes towards having daughters, even though the incentives given to
parents with just daughters, were higher. Sinha and Yoong (2009) evaluate the effects of
another such program in Haryana, Apni Beti Apna Dhan, a financial incentive program
aimed at reducing the sex ratio. They find a positive effect of the program on sex ratio
but no change in desired fertility.
This paper adds to the existing literature on the effects of a CCT program in a
number of important ways. First, my paper quantifies the effect of a CCT program
that is quite different in design from the traditional CCT programs. This is important
because most CCT programs are for poor households and begin payments from the
time of school enrollment. Additionally, most financial incentive programs in India,
are targeted just to below poverty households (Apni Beti Apna Dhan) or do not have
any future financial benefits (Devirupak), both in terms of savings bonds or conditional
on schooling outcomes. LLY on the other hand has the biggest payment far out in
the future but enrollment in the program begins at the time of birth. Second, while
many studies have focused on South America and other regions of the developing world,
this is the one of the few studies to focus on evaluating the impact of CCT programs
in India. India is a transition economy with 17% of the worlds population, but is
still grappling with the problem of skewed sex ratio and strong son-preferences with
huge gender gaps in health and education. Thus, it is useful to understand how such
programs affect the well-being of children in the country. Third, only a handful of
studies have examined the effect of CCT programs on changes in fertility and family
sizes; most of the previous studies have focused on educational and health attainment.
There is a large literature on the impact of quantity on quality (Becker and Lewis, 1973;
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1987; Pitt, Rosenzweig and
Gibbons, 1993). The literature shows that parents change their fertility decisions based
on the birth of twins, access to methods of contraceptives and family planning programs.
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Since the LLY program induces people to have a smaller family size, the quantity-
quality literature will suggest that this will in turn increase parental investments in their
daughters. Therefore, it is important to understand how people change their fertility
and human capital investment decision in response to deferred financial investments.
By including fertility as an outcome, I contribute to the scant literature on the effect
of CCT programs on changing parental decisions for number of children and adopting
family planning practices.
1.3 Program Description
Madhya Pradesh is one of India’s biggest and most populous states with a population
of over 75 million people. It is also among the most backward and poor states in the
country. Like most socio-economically backward states in India, Madhya Pradesh has
historically been a high son preference state and its child sex ratio was 918 females per
1000 males in 2011. 6 There is widespread discrimination against female children in
India that has led to a persistent problem referred to as the phenomenon of ”missing
women” in the literature [Sen, 1989]. One of the reasons for this phenomenon is the
non-registration of female births. The share of registered births in total births .The
female share in registered births was about 46 percent in Madhya Pradesh before the
program. The sex ratio was 841 females per 1000 male registered births.7 By the year
2015, this has increased to 904 females births per 1000 male births.
There are several programs and policies being launched that are meant to ensure
increased survival of female children as well improve their well being. On a similar lines,
the Government of Madhya Pradesh announced and implemented Ladli Laxmi Yojana in
April, 2007.8 Under this program, the beneficiaries are first and second born girls born
6Source: Census 2011, India. Child sex ratio is defined as number of females per 1000 males in the
age group 06 years.
7Civil registration System Data, India
8http : //ladlilaxmi.com/SharadSurabhiLadli/AvedanT ype.aspx
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on and after January 1, 2006 in families with income less than the minimum taxable
income (annual household income less than Rs.250,000(USD 3800)) and whose parents
are residents of the state. Prospective beneficiaries have to register themselves with
their village Anganwadi centers. Another major condition is that the parents agree to
adopt a terminal method of family planning (female (and (or) male sterilization) after
the birth of the second (birth order) daughter and before enrolling her in the program.
As per the program9, the state government buys National Savings Certificates (NSC)10
in the joint name of the girl and the designated Project Officer in the block11. The
amount of NSC bought is Rs. 6000 (USD 100)12 continuously for the first five years,
adding to a total amount of Rs. 30,000 (USD 500). In addition, the girl gets one time
cash payment, at different levels of school completion, of Rs. 2000 (USD 33) cash when
she gets enrolled in the 6th grade, a sum of Rs. 4000 (USD 67) when she enrolls in the
9th grade and a sum of Rs. 7500 (USD 125) when she enrolls in grade 11. The girls will
also receive a monthly allowance of Rs.200 (USD 3) in grades 11 and 1213. Once the
girl turns 21 she is entitled to get a lump sum amount of Rs. 100,000 (USD 1500) with
the maturity of the National Saving Certificates, conditional on her graduating grade 12
and staying unmarried until the age of 18.14
The main objectives of the scheme are to improve child sex ratio at birth, increase
school enrollment at all three levels - primary, secondary and higher secondary, and dis-
courage child marriage. The program was designed such that the parents get a financial
incentive (in the form of a savings bond) as soon as the daughter is born, even though
the payout is much farther in the future. Also, the program rewards parents for sending
their daughters to school, but the cash payment does not begin until she enrolls in grade
9Refer to Table 1
10Interest rate 8% per annum
11 An Indian state is divided into districts and these districts are further divided into blocks.
12The exchange rate is $1=60 INR
13The benefit is extended only for two years. Thus, in case the girl fails to pass grades 11 and 12 in
two years, the benefit would stop by the end of the second year.
14The legal age for a woman to get married in India is 18 years.
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6. Additionally, there are no performance based conditions, both in terms of schooling
and health outcomes, implying that the program is more outcomes based and less action
based. Thus, while this program is similar to other CCT programs (there is transfer of
payments conditional on school participation), the overall design of the LLY program is
quite different. The financial bond bought right at the time of birth helps subsidizing the
cost of raising a daughter and attributes to the importance of making sure that parents
do not discriminate against their daughters and she is financially empowered when she
grows up.
While, the program is well- intentioned, it is not obvious that the program will
indeed benefit the girls. Given that there is no immediate payment transfer to the
parents, it may not induce credit constrained parents to take the initiative to take
better care of and educate their daughters. Parents might not be willing to substitute
present consumption in order to get a bigger future payment. In addition, some parents
might view the future bond payment as a way to pay dowry in the marriage of their
daughter and not necessarily as a way to financially empower their daughter. Therefore,
an important research question is: are CCT programs that intervene at the time of birth
effective enough to improve the well-being of young girls in a developing country, such
as India?
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Registered Births Data
I use the official state panel data from Civil Registration System (CRS) of India, which
provides records of registration of births and deaths. I use the annual reports of CRS
from 2001-2015 to get total registered births and sex ratio at birth for the registered
births. The data for these reports is compiled from the statutory Annual Statistical
Report prepared by the Chief Registrars of Births and Deaths of States and Union
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Territories. The recorded number of registered births are the births that took place and
got registered in the given year itself. That is, for a given year, say 2007, the number
of registered births recorded does not include information on births that took place in
previous years but got registered late in the year 2007.
1.4.2 Female Share and Fertility Data
In order to assess the individual level outcomes, I use the Indian Human Development
Survey 2011-12 (IHDS-II). This is a nationally representative panel data of 42,152 house-
holds. The data is available at the individual and household level and is available at the
district and state level. It includes household socioeconomic characteristics and a roster
of all the members in the household, including ever married women and their fertility
history.
This data is ideal for the analyses on sex ratio and changes in fertility, since it was
conducted in 2011-12. It has information on all the births, live or still/dead, that took
place in a given year. However, given the sampling of the IHDS, this implies that there
is a section of women who have not yet completed childbearing. Though the survey asks
a question about women’s desired number children, using that as a measure of total
fertility is potentially endogenous as it is asked at the time of the survey, by when she
has already given birth. Moreover, given that I am looking at family size and composition
as an outcome, I cannot possibly include family fixed effects.
The first approach to address these issues is to use ”non-eligible” women in MP
and women in other comparison states. The way I define ”eligible” and ”ineligible”
women is described in detail in the next section. Briefly, a woman who can have a
potentially eligible child is defined as treated and the others form the comparison group
in MP and non-MP states. I also include state and woman’s age fixed effects, along with
controls for woman’s education and a set of other household level controls. In addition,
I conduct a set of robustness checks to control for any differential trends in fertility
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in MP and comparison states, by including linear and quadratic state-specific women’s
cohort trends. Second, I drop the youngest (15-19) and the oldest women(41-55) to just
look at women who have possibly completed their childbearing. Additionally, the much
older women cohort might be very different from the younger women as they would have
had children in the distant past under different conditions than the women who became
mothers closer to the policy time, so I later drop them from the sample and run the
specifications as a robustness check.
I look at sex ratio at birth for all the births (and not just the registered births).
Additionally, this data helps enables looking at the birth order of the child, which helps
in defining the eligible and non-eligible group of girls. Since the oldest eligible girl (born
in 2006) will be 5 or 6 by 2011-12, I look at female share among children at birth.15
In order to look at how female survival has changed, I look at female share among all
the surviving children by the time of the survey, aged 0-12 (birth cohorts 2001-2012).
Female share at birth helps us look at the effect on female foeticide whereas female share
at older ages helps us look at the effect on female survival and parental neglect of their
daughters.
I also use IHDS-II to examine the effects on family sizes, fertility and sterilization
outcomes. The data has full birth history of ever married women aged 15-56. This
dataset gives us measure of total number of children ever born to a woman and the total
number of surviving children by the time of survey. Using this information I can calculate
the birth order and sex composition of all the children born to a survey mother.16 The
survey also includes information on methods of contraception (including sterilization)
used by a woman (and) or her husband, as well as standard demographic and household
characteristics.
15using information on all births- children that died after birth and those who were alive by the time
of survey
16I exclude observations with missing values for year of birth of children. Also, I exclude children
who have died. This restriction results in a loss of about 8 percent of the remaining observations.
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1.4.3 Schooling and Cognitive Testing Data
I use the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2009-14 to evaluate the educational
outcomes. These are nationwide, repeated cross sectional surveys, representative at
the state level. The survey covers nearly 700,000 rural children in age group 3-16 per
year- those who are currently enrolled, have never been to school, or have dropped out.
In each rural district, 30 villages are sampled. In each village, 20 randomly selected
households are surveyed. All the children in a selected household, in the age group 5-16
are administered the same tests in basic reading and basic arithmetic.17
The survey asks every child aged 5 and above, four questions each in reading and
math in their native language. The four reading questions are whether the child can
recognize letters; words; read a grade one text and read a grade two text. The reading
scores are coded as 1 if the child correctly answers the questions. Then I calculate the
read score which ranges from 0-4 and is the sum of scores of the four questions.
For testing the math skills, each child is asked to complete four math tasks. The
tasks are whether the child can recognize number 1-9; recognize numbers 10-99; subtract
and can divide. The math score is coded as 1 if the child correctly completes the tasks.
Then I calculate the math score which ranges from 0-4 and is the sum of scores of the
four tasks for every child.
The typical age at which students enroll in school is 5 or 6. Since the oldest eligible
cohort is 8 years old, I use females aged 5-8 to study the schooling and cognitive out-
comes.18 Since the birth cohorts are from 2001-2009 and the exposed birth cohorts are
from 2006-2009, this makes it even less plausible for the third and later born children to
be in households with eligible girls.
17ASER surveyors conduct the surveys on Sundays, when most people are at home and children are
not in school, and must return to households if the children are not present at the time of survey.
18the latest survey round is 2014, so a girl born in 2006 will be 8 by 2014
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1.5 Identification Strategy and Estimating Equations
The objective of my empirical strategy is to assess the causal impact of a conditional
cash transfer program in an Indian state on sex ratio, fertility and educational outcomes.
I use a difference-in-differences framework to study the effects of the policy on all these
outcomes. The incentive structure of the program is given in Table 1. Given this,
my regression analyses is based on two main specifications. First, I use difference-in-
difference-in-differences to examine the effect of the program on sex ratio at birth and
older ages (conditional on survival), and schooling and test scores outcomes of eligible
girls. The second specification employs difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the
effect of the Ladli Laxmi Yojana on the probability of a marginal birth and the sex of
the child; and fertility and sterilization decisions of the parents.
1.5.1 Difference-in-Differences Strategy
Since the program covered first or second born girls born on or after January 1, 2006, I
use girls born before 2006 as the comparison group (Duflo, 2001). Using only the first and
second born girls before 2006, I employ a double difference frameowrk by using the other
five backward states, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Odisha and Rajasthan as
the comparison group. Therefore, I compare outcomes for first and second born girls in
MP and comparison states, before and after the program.
Thus, the difference-in-differences equation using the official state panel registration
data is:
Yjc = β0+β1 · (MPj ·2007&latercohortc)+β2 · (MPj ·2006cohortc)+ δj +γc +Ujc (1.1)
Yjc is the outcome variable for birth cohort c in state j. Since the policy was announced in
2007 for birth cohorts born from 2006, I add 2007 (2007&latercohort) and 2006 cohorts
(2006cohort) separately to distinguish the effects on the two birth cohort samples. The
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policy should not affect the registration of 2006 birth cohorts, as they were already born
by the time policy was announced. δj and γc are the state and cohort fixed effects. β1
is the double difference estimator that estimates the causal impact of the policy on sex
ratio at registered birth and female share in total registered births.
Since, the state panel does not have information on birth order, I cannot use this
data to exploit variation in eligibility by birth order. Moreover, the data only has
information on registered births but not on the unregistered births. Therefore, I study
the effects of the program on sex ratio at birth and later-life survival of females using
the individual-level data with information on universe of births: both registered and
unregistered. Additionally, I can look at all the births that took place in a given year,
irrespective of whether they are alive or dead by the time of survey. Here, I can also use
information on birth year and exploit variation in eligibility by using the birth order.
The difference-in-differences equation using the individual-level data is:
Yijc = β0 + β1 · (MPij · Afteric) + δj + γc + µX ′ijc + Uijc (1.2)
Yijc is the outcome variable for child i from birth cohort c in state j. After is the
dummy variable, coded as 1 for birth cohorts 2006 and later. Sample includes only
first and second born female children. Specification (2) includes fixed effects for state
(δj) and birth cohorts (γc). X
′
ijc is a vector of individual and household characteristics
controls,which includes mother’s age, mother’s education, religion, caste, rural and Below
Poverty Line (BPL) status. β1 is the double difference estimator that would estimate
the causal impact of the policy on female share at birth and among the older age (0-12)
surviving children.
In order to look at fertility and sterilization, I define potentially eligible mothers. A
woman who had no or one child by 2005 becomes a potential eligible mother, given that
her first or (and) second born child (children) would be eligible if they are girls. Given
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that these women were making fertility decisions when the program was introduced, I
can study how fertility decisions changed because of the program.
I estimate the following difference-in-differences equation for a woman i in state j of
age a
Yija = β0+β1 ·(MPj ·Eligiblecase1ia)+β2 ·(MPj ·Eligiblecase2ia)+β3 ·Eligiblecase1ia+
+β4 · Eligiblecase2ia + ωa + δj + µX ′ija + Uija (1.3)
where Yija is the fertility outcome for woman i in state j of age a. Eligiblecase1 is a
woman who had no child by 2005 and Eligiblecase2 is a woman who had just one child
by 2005. Specification(3) includes fixed effects for state (δj) and womans’ age (ωa). X
′
ijy
is a vector of individual and household characteristics controls,which includes woman’s
education, religion, caste, rural and Below Poverty Line (BPL) status. The coefficients
of interest are β1 and β2, to study the effects on two possibly eligible cases of women.
1.5.2 Triple Difference-in-Differences Strategy (DDD)
The main underlying assumption of the DID strategy for the sex ratio and education
outcomes, is that in the absence of the program, the outcomes of both girls and women
in MP would have followed the same trend as that of the similar children and women in
comparison states. I address a majority of omitted variable concerns by comparing the
double difference estimates for first and second born females (the treated birth cohorts),
with the same estimate for the third and later born females.
A major concern with using third and later born females is if the policy itself changes
fertility, using the third and higher birth order children will lead to a selection problem.
However, there are two reasons why using the third and later born will not lead to a
selection bias in this case. First, the fertility results (which I show in section 6) show
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that the though the policy does decrease family size, I find that there is no change in
people having three or four children. The decline in fertility is mostly for couples who
would have had 5 or more children. Second, most of the third born children in the
comparison group, given the time period of my analysis (after policy birth cohorts are
from 2006-2011), are less likely in the families where the first and second born children
would have been eligible. Therefore, these third and late born children are born in
the same years as the first and second born children, but will never be eligible for the
program. To the extent that there are state specific shifts in investments and other
policies or programs for health and education, the higher birth order children will help
control for these changes that will affect child health and education. Thus, I use a triple
difference framework by exploiting variation by birth order and using the third and later
born females as another comparison group, as the preferred specification for sex ratio
and education outcomes.
Therefore, the triple-difference estimate of exposure to the CCT program is estimated
by:
Yijct = β0 + β1 · (MPj · Afterct · 1st2ndBorni) + β2 · (Afterc · 1st2ndBorni)+
β3 · (1st2ndBorni ·MPj) + β4 · (Afteric ·MPj) + β5 · 1st2ndBorni
δj + γc + φt + µX
′
ijct + Uijct (1.4)
where Yijct is the sex ratio and schooling outcomes for a child i in state j of birth
cohort c in year t. 1st2ndBorn is a dummy for first and second born child. The sample
includes only female children. Specification (4) includes fixed effects for state (δj), birth
cohorts (γc) and year of survey (φt)(for ASER data). X
′
ijct is a vector of individual and
household characteristics controls. The main parameter of interest is the triple-difference
estimate of β1.
Before I present my results in the next section, a few points must be taken into
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account. First, inference is based on robust standard errors. Second, I define Aftert
at the year level as t ≥ 2006. This is because births that took place during 2006 were
conceived before the scheme was announced and are unlikely to have been affected by it.
Third, one of the eligibility conditions of LLY is that the family should be non- income
tax payers. I do not enforce this condition when defining eligibility in my analyses.
This is not a major concern as the number of income-tax payers in India is small due
to several tax exemptions.19 Moreover, there is evidence of widespread tax evasion in
India. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the income-tax status of a household is a
strictly enforced or a binding condition for eligibility.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Effects on Sex Ratio
In this section, I test Specification (1) using the official state year data from Civil
Registration System and Specifications (2) and (4) using individual-level data. Table 2
presents the descriptive statistics of the main outcomes using the state panel data. Table
3 presents the summary statistics of the main outcomes using the individual data from
IHDS-II. Both MP and non-MP comparison states are quite similar before the program
is announced. Table 2 shows that for the registered births, the sex ratio and female share
in registered births is similar before the program in both MP and comparison states,
and is 46% in MP.
Figure 1 plots the cohort-specific effects for female share in total births, for registered
births. The figure plots the coefficient of interaction, from equation(1), between the year-
of-birth dummy and the treated state (MP). Given that children born in 2006, though
19Banerjee and Piketty (2005) show that incomes below the top 1 per cent are largely exempt from
taxation in India.
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eligible for the program, could not have been the affected cohort when looking at birth
registration, I find that relative to the 2005 birth cohort, the 2006 birth cohort seems
unaffected. As soon as the program is announced in 2007,the program has a positive
effect on sex ratio at birth and female share in total registered births.20
The estimation results from Specification (1) for the two outcome variables using the
state panel data are reported in Table 5. In columns (1) and (3), the dependent variable
is sex-ratio and the female share in total registered births, respectively. In columns (2)
and (4), the estimation results are from the weighted least square (WLS) regressions,
weighed by the total number of registered births in every year in each state. Using WLS
ensures that all the states do not get an equal weight, as the registration can differ by
the population of each state.
I find that sex ratio at birth improves in Madhya Pradesh after the implementation
of the program and the results are not sensitive to weighing by total registered births
in every state. It is important to understand that this analysis does not include the
unregistered births and I am able to evaluate the effect on just registered births and
find an improvement in sex ratio at birth for registered births. This can be due to an
increase in the survival rate of girls at birth or due to an increase in registration of births
conditional on survival. Both margins are correlated with better well-being of the girls
and is consistent with the program’s condition of registering female birth.
In order to make the results comparable with the individual-level data, I estimate
the effect of the program on female share in total registered births. In Table 5, columns
(3) and (4), I look at the share of female births in total registered births. The results
show that even though overall birth registration has gone up in Madhya Pradesh, female
share in total registered births is increasing at a faster rate after the implementation of
the program in the state.
20In Appendix Table A1, I present results for overall effect on registered births by female and male
registered births separately respectively and find that both are improving but is higher for female births
in the state after the program implementation
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Although the state panel data gives us information on just registered births, these
results can be discussed in relation to the literature on ”missing girls” in India. The
literature identifies two types of ”missing women”, those who are never born through sex-
selective abortions and those who go ”missing” after birth because of non registration
of their births or due to parental neglect leading to child mortality. In this paper, I can
look at the changes in the latter using analysis from the state panel data. I find that sex
ratio at birth goes up by almost 2 per cent. This implies that gap between global (about
105 males for every 100 females) and Madhya Pradesh’s sex ratio at birth (for registered
births) closes after the program. This is an important finding since most of the sex ratio
gap seems to be because of the unregistered births as shown in Table 3. The channel
of non-registration of female births causing missing women seems to be closing after the
policy.
There are several benefits of registering the birth of child, like admission to schools,
obtaining voter ID, employment in government sector, and marriage registration. De-
spite these benefits, some parents do not register female births. One reason can be
holding themselves un-accountable in case the daughter dies. It can also be due to per-
sistent gender discrimination, parents fail to understand the importance of registering
the daughters. Thus, because of the program the number of un-registered female births
seems to go down. This is important for the well-being of girls in both short and long
run.
A limitation of the official state panel data does not help us distinguish if the in-
creased registration of births implies an increase in female birth registration or an in-
crease in overall sex ratio at birth and a decrease in excess female mortality. The
individual-level data includes all births (both registered and not registered) and there-
fore, gives us a deeper insight on changes in child survival relative to the changes in birth
registration conditional on survival. Figure 2 plots the DID coefficients from equation
(2) by birth cohorts. This shows the female share for all the registered and un-registered
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births. I find no change in female share after the policy. Since only the first and second
born girls were eligible for the program, I plot the DID coefficients from equation (2) by
birth cohorts, and by birth order in Figure 3. Panel A shows the female share among
the first and second born children and Panel B shows female share among the third and
later born children. Thus, there is no evidence for change in female share among the
eligible and non-eligible children, by year of birth and by order of birth.
Given that I do not find any evidence of changes in female share among the third and
later born children, this suggests that there is no selection bias when using the gender of
the third born child. Thus, using the triple difference framework discussed in equation
(4), Table 6 shows the effect of the program on female share at birth and older ages,
using the IHDS-II. These results are most comparable to the results in columns (3) and
(4) of Table 5. Using the individual-level data, the coefficients for female share are close
to zero, but I lose significance at the conventional levels. Therefore, I find no evidence
of improvement in female share for the exposed cohort both at birth and at older ages.
Since the results in Table 6 show that there is no evidence of change in sex ratio for
the universe of births, it suggests that the estimated increase in registration is mainly
because of the program condition of registering births and does not necessarily reflects
changes in excess mortality or sex-selective abortions. This shows that parents did not
necessarily change their strong son-preference attitudes in favor of having a daughter.
1.6.2 Effects on Fertility
Furthermore, I estimate the effect of Ladli Laxmi Yojana on the total number and
composition of children. Since one of the policy conditions for the parents of the eligible
girls was to adopt sterilization before enrolling the second born daughter in the program,
I expect couples with eligible second born daughters to have smaller family sizes. In
fact, if the program strictly enforced the family planning condition of sterilization, then
I should find that these families are more likely to stop at two children.
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Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the non-eligible women in MP and com-
parison states for the fertility outcomes. On average, a woman is 35 years old and has
3.72 children in MP. Table 7 reports the DID coefficients from specifications (3) using
indicators for the likelihood of number of children and the specific number of children
as outcomes. Column (1) presents the likelihood of having children and the columns
(2)-(6) present the likelihood of having one, two, three, four and five or more children.
The sample includes ever-married women with at least one child. All specifications in-
clude women’s age and state fixed effects. The estimates show that women which started
childbearing after 2006 (eligible case 1) are more likely to have two or three children. For
women who already had one child by 2005 (eligible case 2), they are less likely to have
two children and are more likely to have three or four children. Both types of women are
less likely to stop at one child and are less likely to have five or more children. Although
I control for a variety of individual and household characteristics, these women may still
be different from those observed at much older ages. As a robustness check, I limit my
sample to women aged 20-40 and find that the effects remain almost unchanged. These
results are reported in Appendix Table A3.
One of the distinctive feature of LLY is that it is more universal in its implementation
and both poor and non-poor households are eligible. Therefore, I look at the effect of
LLY separately on Below Poverty Line (BPL) and non- BPL households.21 In Table 7,
Panels B and C show the results for poor and non-poor households. I find that BPL
families are more likely to have a bigger family size, whereas the non- BPL families seem
to show a stronger response to the program conditions of smaller sizes.
In order to test if the effects on the total number of children differ by the gender
of the first two children, I estimate specification (3) separately by four different gender
combinations of the first two children. These combinations are: boy-girl (BG), girl-girl
(GG), Girl-boy (GB), and boy-boy (BB).Given that the program has a condition of
21BPL households are identified as those that have a BPL Ration Card.
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parents adopting sterilization after the birth of the second daughter, I should find effect
on families with specifically the first two composition of children- one with boy-girl
composition and those with girl-girl composition of the first two children in that order.
Table 8 presents the estimates for this specification. Mothers (eligible case2 women)
with first and second born girls (GG) are more likely to have four children. Eligible
case 1 women are likely to have three children but I lose significance at the conventional
levels. This finding is consistent with the literature suggesting no change in the strong
son-preferences among most parents. Mothers with eligible girls (boy-girl and girl- girl
combination of first and second born children) are less likely to stop at just two children.
Since the government claims all of the eligible families are enrolled in the program and
from the findings in this paper, we can conclude that the condition of family planning was
not enforced. The next section shows the results for the likelihood of parents adopting
sterilization and is another channel through which the program affects family planning
decisions.
Effect on Sterilization
One of the conditions of the LLY program was for the couples with a second born
daughter to adopt sterilization (either or both the parents). I estimate specification
(3) to asses the effect of the program on likelihood of couples getting sterilized. Table
3 presents the descriptive statistics for the non-eligible women in MP and comparison
states. Sterilization is a widely prevalent method of family planning in MP as compared
to the comparison states. On an average 59 and 49 percent women in MP and comparison
states, respectively are sterilized.
To the extent that the program strictly enforced the sterilization condition, I expect
that couples with second born daughters are more likely to get sterilized. However, since
most parents have a strong son-preference attitude, they might not stop after the birth
of daughters. If the program does indeed increase the likelihood of couples to adopt
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sterilization, I expect to find that the two types of eligible mothers are more likely to
get sterilized in MP relative to other states.
Table 9 presents the results for the estimation of specification (3) for the likelihood
of couples getting sterilized. I find that there is an overall increase in the likelihood
of eligible women getting sterilized in MP relative to other states. Also, eligible case 1
women are more likely to get sterilized after two or three children, whereas eligible case
2 women are more likely to get sterilized after three or four children. These estimates
are consistent with the fertility results. Eligible case 1 women are more likely to stop
after three children and eligible case 2 women are likely to stop after four children. Thus,
even though I do not observe the complete fertility history of these two types of women,
I find that they are more likely to have stopped childbearing by the time of survey and
adopted sterilization. Additionally, panels B and C of Table 9 show the effects for poor
and non-poor households and I find that both households are more likely to respond
to the condition of sterilization. However, the response is once again bigger from the
non-BPL families.
To examine the effects of the program condition of sterilization after the second
daughter, I again assess the likelihood of couple adopting sterilization after the second
born daughter. Table 10 presents the results for this estimation, by the gender composi-
tion of children. Columns (2) and (3) show estimation for the combinations of children ,
for which the couple is expected to adopt sterilization under the program. Couples with
two girls (girl-girl combination) are less likely to be sterilized. An interesting finding is
that parents with boy-girl combination are more likely to adopt sterilization as compared
to parents with girl-boy combination of the first two children. This suggests the program
had a positive effect on couples adopting sterilization, given that they have an eligible
daughter and at least one son. If this was true for couples in general and not necessarily
the effect of the program, then I would expect to find the similar effect for couples with
girl-boy combination. Coefficients for the girl-boy specification are positive and signif-
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icant only for case 2 women. Therefore, the results are not necessarily indicative of a
general trend in couples adopting sterilization after the birth of son. Additionally, the
point estimates for boy-girl are relative bigger than girl-boy combination. This shows
that people with an eligible second born daughter did adopt the required sterilization,
if the first born is a son. This finding is consistent with the prevalence of strong son
preference among Indian parents.
In general, the results for total number of children and likelihood of parents adopting
sterilization seems to suggest that parents in MP with eligible daughters did respond to
the program. Though the condition of sterilization does not seem to be implemented as
was initially designed under the program. Also, the results show that parents are either
more likely to have more children or reach their desired family size faster than before
the program in MP. In order to understand these channels better, I examine the effect
of the program on birth spacing.
Effect on Birth Spacing
This section shows results for birth spacing between the first and second born children
for the two types of women after the program. I examine the effect of the program on the
birth spacing between the first two births, by the gender of the first born child. Given
that the program induces parents to have smaller families with at least one daughter,
LLY can possibly increase the probability of sex-selective abortions as parents will most
likely want one son and one (eligible) daughter combination among their children. On
the other hand, birth spacing can also decrease as parents will want to reach their
desired family size faster and gender composition once they have an eligible daughter.
This is because, the results in the previous section show that parents are indeed getting
sterilized, however not at the margin at which the program intended. Since I find that
sex ratio at birth is not changing (when looking at both registered and unregistered
births), we know that changes in sex-selective abortions is not the dominant channel
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here. In order to assess the likelihood of the second, which is a decrease in birth spacing,
I estimate specification (3) with birth spacing between the first and second child as an
outcome.
Table 11 shows the estimation results for changes in birth spacing as a result of the
program. I find that it is indeed the case that couples are more likely to reduce the
birth spacing between the first and second child. Additionally, I find that birth spacing
remains almost unchanged if the first child is a boy, but decreases if the first child is a
girl. These results lend support to the findings from the previous two results on fertility
preferences and imply that the eligible mothers are more likely to decrease birth spacing
in order to reach their desired family size and composition faster, in order to receive
the benefits of the program faster. Overall, I find that mothers who start child bearing
after the program are responding differently to the program as compared to those who
already had a child by 2005.
1.6.3 Effect on Schooling and Cognition
Table 12 shows the estimates of β1 from specification(4) using the ASER data for school-
ing and cognition outcomes. Following the literature, there can be both positive or neg-
ative effects on schooling and education outcomes based on the birth order. Therefore, I
report results separately for the first and second born daughters. Also, since the results
can be confounded by using the higher birth order children as comparison groups, I just
use the third born children as a comparison group here. The birth cohorts are from
2001-2009. Given that I just have three after year birth cohorts from 2006-2009, it is
unlikely that the third borns are in households with eligible girls. Columns (2) and
(3) suggest that LLY had a positive impact on the likelihood of an eligible girl being
enrolled in school and on staying enrolled, respectively. Column (1) shows the highest
grade completed by the child. This is the highest level of schooling completed by the
girl at the time of survey. This is zero if the child was never enrolled in school or if she
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dropped out in grade 1. For those who are currently enrolled, it is the current grade
minus 1 and for those who dropped out, it is the grade in which they dropped out minus
one. I find no significant effect of the program on the highest grade completed.
The results in Tables 13 and 14 show the effect of the program on cognition skills
of the females. The coefficient for the over all math score is positive for both first and
second born daughters but is not significant for the second daughter. The coefficient for
reading scores is also positive but I lose significance at the conventional levels.
Therefore, it seems the program had a positive effect on the likelihood of staying
enrolled in the school for the eligible girls. However, the effect on cognitive skills is
smaller and not significant, but is positive. One reason for these results is that these
girls are still quite young and almost 98 percent children enroll in primary school in
India. The dropout rates are higher in middle and upper level grades, especially for
girls. Therefore, the program is well-intentioned as the one time cash benefits to the
girls are given at the time of enrollment in different levels of school completion, where the
dropout rates have traditionally been higher. Additionally, it is also possible that not
all credit constrained parents respond positively to the program in terms of investing in
their daughters education. As the literature shows, parents in poor households associate
a high opportunity cost with sending their daughters to school, the results I find are less
surprising as I analyze the effects on children in rural households.22
1.7 Robustness
My identification strategy relies on the assumption that in the absence of LLY, Madhya
Pradesh and the other comparison states did not have systematically different time
patterns in the outcome variables. While I show the trends for before years (2001-
2005), I can also test whether the results are driven by inclusion of any particular
comparison state. Although, all the specifications control for individual and household
22 ASER survey is done only in rural households
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characteristics, I re-estimate specification (1) dropping one comparison state at a time.
Table A2 presents these results for the state panel data that are comparable with results
in Table 5. The results are still significantly positive, showing increase in number of
female registered births.
Since the identification also depends on evaluating just the effects of LLY affecting
just the eligible females, it is important to account for simultaneous policies or any
other changes that can also potentially affect the treated population. For the fertility
results, it is important to account for other government programs that target fertility
and family planning decisions of women. Although, I include women’s age fixed-effects
in all the specifications, I also control for any changes in women’s fertility decisions that
differ by different age cohorts in different states. However, it is still possible that other
programs specific to a comparison states are confounding the results. While I cannot
directly control for state-specific time trends because of the single cross-section data, I
address this issue by controlling for state-specific women’s cohort trends by re-estimating
specification (3). If my results are capturing the effect of the LLY program on fertility
decisions of parents, I should get robust results by adding this additional control. Tables
A5 and A6 report the results and find that fertility and family planning results are robust
to adding state-specific women’s age cohorts.
Next I conduct a placebo test for the schooling and cognition outcomes, by reassigning
the intervention to alternate year. Using the ASER data, I restrict my sample to birth
cohorts 1993-2000. Next, I re-assign 1996 as the placebo policy year. This makes
children of birth cohorts 1996-2000 as the eligible cohort and 1993-1995 birth cohorts as
the comparison group. The comparison states are the same. If my results are capturing
the causal impact of LLY on the schooling and cognition outcomes of girls, I should not
find significant effects in the placebo regressions. Table A7 shows the results for this
placebo test. I do not find significant effects as my main results in Tables 12, 13 and
14. In fact, most of these placebo estimations are close to zero, giving credibility to my
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estimation strategy and implying a causal interpretation of my main results.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the effect of a conditional cash transfer program that differs in
features from most conventional CCT programs on sex ratio, birth registration, fertility
and parental investment in their daughters.
I find that the incentive of getting a huge financial payment in future is not enough
to induce parents to give up the strong son-preference attitude. I find that the program
does not have an effect on changing the sex ratio at birth, looking at the universe
of births. However, there is a significant increase in the registration of female births.
Therefore, there is no effect on female mortality but a positive effect on birth registration.
Additionally, the program has a limited yet positive effect on improving the education
outcomes of the eligible girls, both in terms of schooling and cognitive skills. With
respect to the fertility outcomes, although people with eligible daughters are more likely
to be sterilized, parents with two daughters are less likely to stop at two children as well
as adopt sterilization. I also find an unintended negative effect of the program, inducing
people to have children faster and thereby reducing the birth spacing among children.
This is specially worse when the first born is a girl. Oveall however, parents are less
likely to have four or more children, but most continue to have at least three children.
There can be several reasons for these effects of the program. First, for the credit
constrained households to react positively to the program, the financial benefits are much
farther out in the future which can make it difficult for them to re-allocate present day
resources. Second, the program is based on outcomes and not actions, like PROGRESA.
Parents have to make sure that their daughter graduates from school (grade 12) in order
to get the financial payment, therefore, providing them with an incentive to induce
improved learning and cognition skills of the daughter. Also given the data, oldest
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treated cohort is just eight years old and so it may be too early to find comprehensive
changes in schooling outcomes for these children.Although, since I already find evidence
of positive effect of this program on both schooling and learning outcomes, this seems
encouraging and will hopefully grow further at higher grades.23
Thus, the analyses presented in this paper have the following policy implications.
First, if a less male biased sex ratio is desired, it is desirable to incentivize couples with
daughters and not just the first two daughters. This will ensure that parents do not
decrease birth spacing when the first born is a daughter, and it will ensure that there
are fewer sex selective abortions. Thus, a potential recommendation is to design the
program such that parents are incentivized to have daughters, while also allowing them
to have a minimum number of desired boys, as an effort to change attitudes towards
female discrimination. This will also help ensure less biased attitude towards daughters
and will result in fewer ”missing women”. Second, it is important to understand the
difference between credit constrained and non-credit constrained households. In this
respect, the policy can be more targeted and incentivize poor households more than the
non-poor households.
23In India, dropout rates are lower at primary level (about 4%) and much higher at middle and
secondary level (grades 6-10), Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) 2014-15
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Cohort-specific Effects: Female Share in Registered Births Using
Official State Panel Data
Figure 1.2: Female Share in Registered Births
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Notes: Author’s calculation of sex ratio and female share at registered births using the Civil Registration
System data. This figure plots the difference-in-differences coefficients of the interactions year-of-birth
and Madhya Pradesh (MP) dummies from equation (1). Birth cohort 2005 is the omitted reference
group from both the specifications.
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Figure 1.3: Cohort-specific Effects: Female Share at Birth using Household
Survey Data
-0.5
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012
Fe
m
al
e 
sh
ar
e 
in
 t
o
ta
l b
ir
th
s
Year of Birth
Coeff 95% CI
Notes: Author’s calculation of female share at birth, for all the births (registered and non-registered
births, and for children alive and the ones who died by the time of survey) using the IHDS,2011-12.
This figure plots the difference-in-differences coefficients of the interactions year-of-birth and Madhya
Pradesh (MP) dummies from equation (2). Birth cohort 2005 is the omitted reference group.
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Figure 1.4: Cohort-specific Effects: Female Share at Birth by Birth Order
using Household Survey Data
(a) First and Second Born Children
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(b) Third and Later Born Children
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Notes: Author’s calculation of female share at birth by birth order, for all the births (those alive
by the time of survey) using the IHDS,2011-12. This figure plots the coefficients of the difference-in-
differences interactions year-of-birth and Madhya Pradesh (MP) dummies from equation (2). Panel (a)
shows the female share among the first and second born children. Panel (b) shows the female share
among the third and later born children. Birth cohort 2005 is the omitted reference group from both
the specifications.
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1.10 Table
Table 1.1: Incentive Structure of Ladli Laxmi Yojana
Age/Grade Amount Form of Payment
1-5 years National Saving Certificate Girls can redeem certificates
of Rs.6000 each for 5 years at age 21, conditional on:
(Total: Rs.30000) (a) Completing grade 12
On Maturity: Rs.100,000 (b) Unmarried until 18
Enrolling in Grade 6 Rs.2000 one- time cash
Enrolling in Grade 9 Rs.4000 one-time cash
Enrolling in Grade 11 Rs.7500 one-time cash
During Grades 11-12 Rs.200 monthly
Notes: This table shows the incentive structure of Ladli Laxmi Yojana over time. The state
government buys National Savings Certificates for the first five years of the eligible girls’
life. These certificates are redeemable for a guaranteed sum of Rs.100,000 (approximately
$1600) when the girl turns 21 years of age.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables Using Official State Panel
Data
Variables MP Non-MP
Sex Ratio 0.85 0.88
[0.01] [0.05]
Female Share in total registered births 0.46 0.47
[0.00] [0.02]
Log( Female registered births) 12.93 12.26
[0.23] [0.74]
Share of total births registered 0.48 0.58
[0.11] [0.20]
Observations 6 24
Notes: State-year data on all registered births comes from the Civil Registra-
tion System database from year 2001-06. MP is the treated state, Madhya
Pradesh. Non-MP states are Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Rajasthan and
Uttaranchal. Sex Ratio is at birth and is calculated as total female births di-
vided by total male births. Female share is measured as the total number of
female births registered as the percentage of total registered births. Share of
total registered births is defined as the percentage of registered births to the to-
tal number of births estimated through Sample Registration System Data.The
means of the specified variables are calculated separately for Madhya Pradesh
and the control states, for births registered before 2007. Standard deviations
appear in brackets.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Key Variables Using Household Survey Data
(Indian Human Development Survey)
MP Non- MP MP Non- MP
Sample A: Child-level variables Sample B: Women-level variables
Age 2.00 2.03 Age 35.81 36.00
( 1.40) (1.35) ( 5.13) (5.09)
Schedule Caste 0.18 0.17 Schedule Caste 0.17 0.20
(0.39) (0.37) (0.38) (0.40)
Schedule Tribe 0.21 0.17 Schedule Tribe 0.20 0.12
(0.41) (0.38) (0.40) (0.33)
Other Backward Castes 0.42 0.45 Other Backward Castes 0.43 0.42
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Rural 0.82 0.71 Rural 0.81 0.68
(0.39) (0.45) (0.39) (0.47)
Below Poverty Line 0.37 0.35 Below Poverty Line 0.36 0.32
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47)
Female 0.47 0.49
(0.50) (0.50)
Sterilization 0.59 0.49
(0.49) (0.49)
#Children 3.72 3.59
(1.41) (1.38)
Boy-Girl 0.25 0.26
(0.43) (0.44)
Girl-Girl 0.31 0.27
(0.46) (0.44)
Girl-Boy 0.24 0.24
(0.43) (0.43)
Boy-Boy 0.21 0.23
(0.40) (0.42)
Observations 1274 1104 2992 5102
Notes: Summary statistics for outcome and control variables in Madhya Pradesh and comparison states (Non-MP).
Sample A is the child-level sample of children from birth cohorts 2001-2005. Sample B is the women-level sample of
ever married women with at least one child. Eligible case 1 and 2 are women who had no children up to year 2005 and
those who had one child by 2005, respectively.The variables are a mean outcome for the women who are in neither of
the two categories of eligible women. Below Poverty Line (BPL)are households that have a BPL ration card.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of Key Schooling Variables Using Household
Survey Data (Annual Status of Education Report)
MP Non- MP
Panel A: Schooling outcomes
Highest Grade Completed 1.28 1.20
(1.21) ( 1.22)
Ever Enrolled 0.99 0.98
(0.10) (0.15)
Currently Enrolled 0.91 0.88
(0.28) (0.33)
Current Grade 2.39 2.36
(1.20) (1.21)
Panel B: Math Test Scores
Math Score 1.38 1.29
(1.09) (1.14)
Math Nothing 0.13 0.17
(0.34) (0.38)
Numbers 1 to 9 0.36 0.32
(0.48) (0.47)
Numbers 10 to99 0.26 0.23
( 0.44) (0.42)
Subtract 0.11 0.11
(0.31) (0.31)
Divide 0.05 0.05
(0.21) (0.21)
Panel C: Read Test Scores
Read Score 1.55 1.44
(1.23) (1.29)
Read Nothing 0.13 0.17
( 0.34) (0.38)
Read Letter 0.33 0.30
(0.47) (0.46)
Read Word 0.23 0.20
(0.42) (0.40)
Read Grade 1 Text 0.13 0.11
(0.34) (0.31)
Read Grade 2 Text 0.09 0.10
(0.29) (0.30)
Observations 20760 49284
Notes: Summary statistics for schooling and math test scores in Madhya Pradesh and comparison
states (Non-MP). Sample is child-level data of birth cohorts 2001-2009. Highest Grade Completed
is the current grade minus 1 for those who are currently attending school and dropout grade minus
1 for those who dropped out. If a child never enrolled then, highest grade is coded as 0. Ever
Enrolled is if the child was (is) enrolled in a school. Currently attending school is a dummy if the
child is currently enrolled in school. Current grade is the grade in which the child is currently at.
Math score ranges from 0-4 and is the sum of scores for the four questions (scored 1 or 0)- nothing;
numbers 1 to 9; numbers 10 to99; subtract and divide. Read score also ranges from 0-4 and is the
sum of four questions- nothing; letter; word; grade 1 text and grade 2 text. Standard deviation is
reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.5: Effect on Female Share and Sex Ratio Using Official State Panel
Data from Civil Registration System
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Female Share Female Share
(Weighted) (Weighted)
MP*2007&later 0.0716*** 0.0663*** 0.0200*** 0.0185***
(0.0133) (0.0141) (0.00376) (0.00400)
MP*2006 0.0159 0.0135 0.00443 0.00368
(0.0137) (0.0125) (0.00389) (0.00352)
Observations 83 83 83 83
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows results for equation (1) for outcomes sex ratio at birth and female
share at birth for registered births. In columns 2 and 4 estimations are weighted least
squares, weighted by total number of registered births in every year in each state. Sample
and variables are as described in Table 2. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Effect on Female Share at Birth and at Older Ages using Household
Survey Data
(1) (2)
Female Female
(At Birth) (Ages 0-12)
MP*After* 1st2ndBorn -0.00828 -0.0173
(0.0572) (0.0493)
MP* 1st2ndBorn -0.0167 -0.00937
(0.0425) (0.0308)
After*1st2ndBorn 0.0146 0.0166
(0.0423) (0.0348)
MP* After 0.0334 0.0372
(0.0451) (0.0395)
Observations 5,405 5,048
Cohort FE Y Y
State FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
Controls Y Y
Notes: Table shows results from equation (2) for outcomes female share at birth
and at older ages. Sample includes children aged 0-12 in IHDS 2011-12. For
column (1), sample includes all children that are alive or had died by the time
of survey. Column (2) includes children that are alive by the time of survey.
1st2nd born is a dummy if the child is either a first or a second born. MP
is the state dummy for Madhya Pradesh. After is a birth cohort dummy for
children born in 2006 and later. Controls include mother’s age and education,
caste, religion, BPL and rural. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Effect on Total Number of Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Children=
#child. 1 2 3 4 5 or more
Panel A: All Women
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.0729 -0.147*** 0.125*** 0.0666*** -0.0180 -0.0268***
(0.0490) (0.0219) (0.0276) (0.0226) (0.0127) (0.0103)
MP* Eligible Case 2 0.136** -0.0469*** -0.0504* 0.0375 0.0865*** -0.0267**
(0.0600) (0.0164) (0.0291) (0.0287) (0.0228) (0.0128)
Observations 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113
Panel B: BPL Women
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.353*** -0.169*** 0.0578 0.135*** -0.0574** 0.0330*
(0.0975) (0.0408) (0.0520) (0.0464) (0.0241) (0.0197)
MP* Eligible Case 2 0.258** -0.0229 -0.00132 -0.0785 0.0529 0.0498*
(0.113) (0.0312) (0.0541) (0.0548) (0.0411) (0.0260)
Observations 3,506 3,506 3,506 3,506 3,506 3,506
Panel C: Non-BPL Women
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.0688 -0.135*** 0.151*** 0.0399 -0.00216 -0.0536***
(0.0577) (0.0260) (0.0327) (0.0253) (0.0155) (0.0123)
MP* Eligible Case 2 0.0696 -0.0520*** -0.0789** 0.0946*** 0.0950*** -0.0588***
(0.0716) (0.0194) (0.0347) (0.0338) (0.0278) (0.0147)
Observations 7,607 7,607 7,607 7,607 7,607 7,607
Woman’s Age FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table shows results of having different family sizes for eligible woman. Eligible case 1 is a woman who had no children until
2005. Eligible case 2 is a woman who had just 1 child until 2005. Sample as described in Table 3 (Sample B) and has women who have
at least one child. MP is the state dummy for Madhya Pradesh. Controls include controls for woman’s education, rural, religion, caste
and BPL status. Column (1) shows the likelihood of having children. Columns (2)-(6) show the likelihood of having exactly 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5 or more children, respectively. Panel B and C show results by the BPL status of the household. Robust Standard errors are in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Effect on Total Number of Children by Gender of the First Two
Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Children=
#child. 2 3 4 5 or more
Panel A: Boy-Girl
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.109 -0.00518 -0.00689 -0.0582** 0.0703***
(0.112) (0.0522) (0.0567) (0.0249) (0.0256)
MP* Eligible Case 2 -0.194 0.0484 -0.00978 -0.0165 -0.0221
(0.119) (0.0662) (0.0656) (0.0486) (0.0261)
Observations 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579
Panel B: Girl-Girl
MP* Eligible Case 1 -0.339*** 0.0372 0.0835 -0.00578 -0.115***
(0.100) (0.0595) (0.0659) (0.0371) (0.0255)
MP* Eligible Case 2 0.187* -0.185*** 0.0680 0.207*** -0.0900***
(0.100) (0.0468) (0.0605) (0.0539) (0.0250)
Observations 2,886 2,886 2,886 2,886 2,886
Panel C: Girl- Boy
MP* Eligible Case 1 -0.142 -0.0233 0.0881 -0.00962 -0.0552***
(0.0863) (0.0539) (0.0559) (0.0259) (0.0204)
MP* Eligible Case 2 0.104 -0.153*** 0.107* 0.0625* -0.0162
(0.107) (0.0573) (0.0617) (0.0380) (0.0299)
Observations 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562
Panel D: Boy-Boy
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.297*** -0.114** 0.0811 -0.0175 0.0503***
(0.0879) (0.0555) (0.0533) (0.0303) (0.0170)
MP* Eligible Case 2 0.304*** -0.0242 -0.0966 0.0442 0.0767***
(0.112) (0.0647) (0.0617) (0.0415) (0.0289)
Observations 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373
Woman’s Age FE Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table shows results of having different family sizes for eligible woman. Eligible case 1 is a woman who
had no children until 2005. Eligible case 2 is a woman who had just 1 child until 2005. Sample as described in Table
3 (Sample B) and has women who have at least two children. MP is the state dummy for Madhya Pradesh. Controls
include woman’s education, rural, religion, caste and BPL status. Column (1) shows the likelihood of having children.
Columns (2)-(5) show the likelihood of having exactly 2, 3, 4 and 5 or more children, respectively. Panel A, B, C and
D show results by the gender of the first two children in that order. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
46
Table 1.9: Effect on Sterilization by the Total Number of Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var. Sterilized Full Sample Has 2 Children Has 3 Children Has 4 Children Has 5 or more Children
Panel A: All Women
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.0839*** 0.0477 0.205*** 0.340** ∅
(0.0244) (0.0408) (0.0582) (0.155)
MP* Eligible Case 2 0.0863*** -0.00613 0.113** 0.164** 0.897***
(0.0296) (0.0505) (0.0522) (0.0715) (0.0906)
Observations 11,113 3,046 3,342 2,176 1,836
Panel B: BPL Women
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.0788* 0.0743 0.328*** ∅ ∅
(0.0460) (0.0836) (0.0932)
MP* Eligible Case2 0.0401 -0.127 0.127 0.714*** -0.0242
(0.0557) (0.101) (0.0989) (0.115) (0.185)
Observations 3,506 774 1,101 716 748
Panel C: Non-BPL Women
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.0927*** 0.0264 0.221*** 0.426*** ∅
(0.0288) (0.0477) (0.0775) (0.146)
MP* Eligible Case 2 0.110*** 0.0245 0.112* 0.0428 0.912***
(0.0353) (0.0592) (0.0629) (0.0874) (0.116)
Observations 7,607 2,272 2,241 1,460 1,088
Woman’s Age FE Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table shows results for likelihood of being sterilized ( woman or her husband) for the two categories of women, by the total number of
children. Eligible case 1 is a woman who had no children until 2005. Eligible case 2 is a woman who had just 1 child until 2005. Sample as described in
Table 3 (Sample B) and has women who have at least one child. MP is the state dummy for Madhya Pradesh. Controls include controls for woman’s
education, rural, religion, caste and BPL status. Column (1) shows the likelihood of adopting sterilization for the entire sample. Columns (2)-(5) show
the likelihood of adopting sterilization if the woman has exactly 2, 3, 4 and 5 or more children, respectively. Panel B and C show results by the BPL
status of the household. ∅ Sample does not have any eligible case 1 woman with 5 or more children in MP and none for BPL households with 4 or
more children. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.10: Likelihood of being sterilized after the policy, by gender of the
first two children
Dep. Var. Sterilized All BG GG GB BB
Panel A: All Women
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.0839*** 0.158** -0.170*** 0.0508 0.374***
(0.0244) (0.0623) (0.0350) (0.0577) (0.0569)
MP* Eligible Case 2 0.0863*** 0.219*** 0.0518 0.118* 0.0831
(0.0296) (0.0676) (0.0517) (0.0624) (0.0667)
Observations 11,113 2,579 2,886 2,562 2,373
Panel B: BPL Women
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.0788* 0.136 -0.212*** -0.0197 0.532***
(0.0460) (0.141) (0.0677) (0.109) (0.105)
MP* Eligible Case2 0.0401 0.255** -0.00769 0.0189 0.0847
(0.0557) (0.121) (0.105) (0.122) (0.112)
Observations 3,506 805 907 824 803
Panel C: Non- BPL Women
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.0927*** 0.160** -0.193*** 0.0597 0.327***
(0.0288) (0.0721) (0.0344) (0.0707) (0.0687)
MP* Eligible Case2 0.110*** 0.162** 0.100* 0.161** 0.0633
(0.0353) (0.0818) (0.0599) (0.0726) (0.0840)
Observations 7,607 1,774 1,979 1,738 1,570
Woman’s Age FE Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table shows results for likelihood of being sterilized ( woman or her husband) for the two categories of
women, by the gender of the first two children in that order. Eligible case 1 is a woman who had no children until
2005. Eligible case 2 is a woman who had just 1 child until 2005. Sample as described in Table 3 (Sample B) and
has women who have at least two children. MP is the state dummy for Madhya Pradesh. Controls include controls
for woman’s education, rural, religion, caste and BPL status. Panel B and C show results by the BPL status of the
household. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
BG= Boy-Girl; GG= Girl-Girl; GB= Girl-Boy; BB- Boy- Boy
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Table 1.11: Effect on Birth Spacing between the first and second child
(1) (2) (3)
Dep.Var. Birth spacing All First Born First Born
is Boy is Girl
Panel A: All Women
MP* Eligible Case 1 -0.0358 0.00863 -0.106
(0.0731) (0.107) (0.100)
MP* Eligible Case2 -0.173 0.210 -0.512***
(0.130) (0.221) (0.146)
Observations 10,400 4,952 5,448
Panel B: BPL
MP* Eligible Case 1 -0.128 0.302 -0.370*
(0.158) (0.238) (0.204)
MP* Eligible Case2 -0.173 0.328 -0.733**
(0.232) (0.337) (0.310)
Observations 3,339 1,608 1,731
Panel C: Non-BPL
MP* Eligible Case 1 0.0297 -0.0761 0.110
(0.0842) (0.120) (0.122)
MP* Eligible Case2 -0.124 0.233 -0.372**
(0.156) (0.282) (0.169)
Observations 7,061 3,344 3,717
Woman’s Age FE Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
Notes: This table shows results for birth spacing between the first and second born child,
conditional on having at least two children. Eligible case 1 is a woman who had no children
until 2005. Eligible case 2 is a woman who had just 1 child until 2005. Sample as described in
Table 3 (Sample B) and has women who have at least two children. MP is the state dummy
for Madhya Pradesh. Controls include controls for woman’s education, rural, religion, caste
and BPL status. Panel B and C show results by the BPL status of the household. Robust
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.12: Effect on Schooling Outcomes for Females Aged 5-8 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest Grade Ever Currently Current
Completed Enrolled Attending School Grade
MP* After * 1stBorn 0.00724 0.00862** 0.0261** -0.00703
(0.0333) (0.00407) (0.0119) (0.0387)
MP* After * 2ndBorn 0.00688 2.15e-05 0.0250** -0.00698
(0.0306) (0.00397) (0.0112) (0.0361)
MP* 1stBorn -0.0189 -0.00904*** -0.0141** -0.00511
(0.0232) (0.00261) (0.00605) (0.0245)
After * 1stBorn -0.0307* -0.000447 -0.0257*** -0.0412**
(0.0176) (0.00261) (0.00676) (0.0207)
MP* 2ndBorn -0.0206 -0.00317 -0.00366 -0.0192
(0.0185) (0.00219) (0.00500) (0.0198)
After * 2ndBorn -0.0201 0.00257 -0.0101 -0.0238
(0.0166) (0.00252) (0.00642) (0.0200)
MP* After 0.00199 -0.0126*** -0.0234*** 0.0485*
(0.0227) (0.00310) (0.00855) (0.0273)
Observations 112,073 112,073 112,073 93,639
Year of Birth FEs Y Y Y Y
Year FEs Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: The table shows result for schooling outcomes for females aged 5-8 years. Sample as
described in Table 4. Controls include control for mother’s age. Robust Standard errors are in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.13: Effect on Math Scores of Females Aged 5-8 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Nothing Numbers Numbers Subtract Divide
Score 1 to 9 10 to 99
MP* After* 1st born 0.0568* 0.00402 -0.0188 -0.0276** 0.0230*** 0.0155***
(0.0314) (0.0146) (0.0163) (0.0130) (0.00806) (0.00539)
MP* After*2ndBorn 0.0229 -0.0117 -0.00305 0.00355 0.00820 -0.00144
(0.0279) (0.0137) (0.0147) (0.0112) (0.00680) (0.00457)
MP*1st born -0.172*** 0.0350*** 0.0186* 0.00848 -0.0396*** -0.0222***
(0.0232) (0.00797) (0.0110) (0.0100) (0.00698) (0.00473)
After* 1st born 0.0166 0.00142 0.0283*** 0.0266*** -0.00633 -0.0115***
(0.0184) (0.00784) (0.00867) (0.00706) (0.00486) (0.00322)
MP*2ndBorn -0.0569*** 0.0200*** -0.00418 -0.00174 -0.0117** -0.00355
(0.0187) (0.00652) (0.00884) (0.00789) (0.00563) (0.00384)
After*2ndBorn 0.0263 0.00603 0.00633 0.0164*** -0.00114 -0.00236
(0.0163) (0.00746) (0.00794) (0.00617) (0.00404) (0.00264)
MP* After -0.222*** 0.0889*** -0.0183* -0.0438*** -0.0271*** -0.00865***
(0.0200) (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.00790) (0.00472) (0.00319)
Observations 112,073 112,073 112,073 112,073 112,073 112,073
Year of Birth FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: The table shows estimates for math skills of females aged 5-8 years. Sample as described in Table 4. Controls
include control for mother’s age. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.14: Effect on Read Scores of Females Aged 5-8 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Read Nothing Letter Word Grade I Grade II
Score Text Text
MP* After* 1st born 0.0187 -0.00730 -0.00385 -0.0184 0.0165* 0.00245
(0.0375) (0.0147) (0.0159) (0.0119) (0.00887) (0.00873)
MP* After* 2ndBorn 0.0126 -0.0223 0.00922 0.00768 0.00384 -0.00587
(0.0331) (0.0138) (0.0143) (0.0104) (0.00764) (0.00725)
MP* 1st born -0.185*** 0.0415*** 0.0146 0.00682 -0.0244*** -0.0350***
(0.0271) (0.00794) (0.0107) (0.00952) (0.00738) (0.00701)
After* 1st born 0.0326 0.00443 0.0254*** 0.0158** 0.00627 -0.0108**
(0.0218) (0.00794) (0.00840) (0.00644) (0.00494) (0.00519)
MP* 2ndBorn -0.0633*** 0.0182*** -0.00186 0.000935 -0.00742 -0.0103*
(0.0212) (0.00647) (0.00861) (0.00766) (0.00606) (0.00526)
After* 2ndBorn 0.0287 0.0121 0.00527 0.00739 -0.000852 0.00281
(0.0193) (0.00760) (0.00766) (0.00569) (0.00428) (0.00428)
MP* After -0.261*** 0.0936*** -0.000708 -0.0456*** -0.0388*** -0.0131***
(0.0237) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.00746) (0.00541) (0.00500)
Observations 112,073 112,073 112,073 112,073 112,073 112,073
Year of Birth FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: The table shows estimates for reading skills of females aged 5-8 years. Sample as described in Table 4. Controls
include control for mother’s age. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.11 Appendix
Table A1: Impact of the Program on Birth Registration Using State Panel
Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log (female regd.) log (male regd.) log(female regd.) log(male regd.) Regd. share
(Weighted) (Weighted)
MP* 2007&later 0.269*** 0.192** 0.225*** 0.154** 0.143***
(0.0979) (0.0896) (0.0769) (0.0694) (0.0509)
Observations 83 83 83 83 89
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Sample is the same as described in Table 2. Log (female regd.) and log (male regd.) are the
log values of total number of female and male births registered, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) are
weighted least square estimations of columns (1) and (2), weighted by the total number of registered
births in every year, in each state. Regd. share is the share of registration as a percentage of total
estimated number of births. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table A2: Robustness Check by Dropping Comparison States One by One
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State Dropped
Chhatisgarh Jharkhand Odisha Rajasthan Uttarakhand
Coefficient of MP *2007&later
Sex Ratio 0.0675*** 0.0745*** 0.0547*** 0.0767*** 0.0683***
(0.0139) (0.0112) (0.0101) (0.0128) (0.0123)
Sex Ratio(Weighted) 0.0629*** 0.0661*** 0.0468*** 0.0819*** 0.0631***
(0.0137) (0.0125) (0.0110) (0.0118) (0.0126)
Observations 68 72 68 68 71
Female Share 0.0189*** 0.0209*** 0.0154*** 0.0215*** 0.0191***
(0.00390) (0.00316) (0.00290) (0.00357) (0.00348)
Female Share(Weighted) 0.0176*** 0.0185*** 0.0132*** 0.0228*** 0.0177***
(0.00389) (0.00357) (0.00321) (0.00328) (0.00359)
Observations 68 72 68 68 71
Log(Female regd births) 0.220** 0.335*** 0.163 0.346*** 0.266**
(0.0967) (0.0868) (0.0991) (0.119) (0.103)
Log(Female regd births)(Weighted) 0.214*** 0.259*** 0.0930 0.356*** 0.225***
(0.0771) (0.0727) (0.0646) (0.102) (0.0787)
Observations 68 72 68 68 71
Share of Registration 0.116** 0.186*** 0.117** 0.187*** 0.108**
(0.0486) (0.0534) (0.0574) (0.0581) (0.0483)
Share of Registration(Weighted) 0.0661* 0.0968** 0.0250 0.164*** 0.0798**
(0.0354) (0.0381) (0.0358) (0.0440) (0.0384)
Observations 72 72 72 72 75
State FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Sample as described in Table 2. This table reports the DID coefficients from equation(1)
when comparison states are dropped one at a time. Outcomes with (Weighted) are weighted least
square estimations of the equation (1), weighted by the total number of registered birth in every year,
in each state, excluding the state that is dropped in the respective specifications. Robust Standard
errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
54
Table A3: Effect on Total Number of Children, Women Aged 20-40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Children
#child. 1 2 3 4 5 or more
MP*Eligible Case1 0.156*** -0.150*** 0.119*** 0.0726*** -0.0339** -0.00749
(0.0498) (0.0221) (0.0283) (0.0234) (0.0136) (0.0107)
MP*Eligible Case2 0.210*** -0.0402** -0.0646** 0.0391 0.0729*** -0.00709
(0.0606) (0.0158) (0.0296) (0.0295) (0.0236) (0.0131)
Observations 9,713 9,713 9,713 9,713 9,713 9,713
Women’s Age FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table shows results for total number of children, for women aged 20-40. Sample as
described in table 3 and has women with at least one child. All specifications have women’s age fixed
effects and state fixed effects and controls for individual and household characteristics. Robust Standard
errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A4: Effect on Sterilization by Number of Children, women aged 20-40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Children
#child. 2 3 4 5 or more
MP*Eligible Case1 0.0854*** 0.0304 0.206*** 0.312**
(0.0252) (0.0420) (0.0590) (0.156)
MP*Eligible Case2 0.0870*** -0.0339 0.109** 0.174** 0.850***
(0.0304) (0.0515) (0.0531) (0.0722) (0.0875)
Observations 9,713 2,766 2,962 1,888 1,460
Women’s Age FE Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table shows results for likelihood of getting sterilized, for women aged 20-40.
Sample as described in Table 3 has women with at least one child. All specifications have
women’s age fixed effects and state fixed effects. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5: Effect on Total Number of Children with state specific women’s
cohort trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# child. # child.=1 # child.=2 # child.=3 # child.=4 # child.¿=5
MP*Eligible Case1 0.207*** -0.161*** 0.113*** 0.0823*** -0.0425** 0.00810
(0.0747) (0.0241) (0.0334) (0.0305) (0.0213) (0.0182)
MP*Eligible Case2 0.205*** -0.0558*** -0.0559* 0.0487 0.0718*** -0.00885
(0.0714) (0.0200) (0.0316) (0.0308) (0.0242) (0.0156)
Observations 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113
StatexWoman’s Cohort Trend Y Y Y Y Y Y
Women’s Age FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table shows results for total number of children. Sample as described in Table 3 and
has women with at least one child. All specifications include state-specific women’s cohort trends,
and women’s age and state fixed effects. Controls added for individual and household characteristics.
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A6: Effect on Sterilization by Number of Children, with state specific
women’s cohort trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
sterilized sterilized sterilized sterilized sterilized
# child. # child.=2 # child.=3 # child.=4 # child.¿=5
MP*Eligible Case1 0.0815** 0.00424 0.166** 0.333**
(0.0322) (0.0559) (0.0688) (0.159)
MP*Eligible Case2 0.0832*** -0.0380 0.0853 0.188** 0.729***
(0.0321) (0.0552) (0.0594) (0.0834) (0.115)
Observations 11,113 3,046 3,342 2,176 1,836
StatexWoman’s Cohort Trend Y Y Y Y Y
Women’s Age FE Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table shows results for likelihood of getting sterilized ( woman or her husband). Sample
as described in Table 3 and has women with at least one child. All specifications include state-specific
women’s cohort trends, and women’s age and state fixed effects. Controls added for individual and
household characteristics. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
58
Table A7: Placebo Test: Reassign intervention to alternate age groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ever Currently Current Highest Grade Math Read
Enrolled Enrolled Grade Completed Score Score
MP* Psuedoafter* firstborn -0.00304 0.0216 -0.224 -0.0404 -0.0817 -0.115
(0.0154) (0.0314) (0.161) (0.199) (0.0920) (0.124)
MP* Psuedoafter*secondborn 0.000257 0.0460 -0.192 0.0261 -0.0379 -0.0960
(0.0162) (0.0328) (0.167) (0.207) (0.0956) (0.129)
Psuedoafter*firstborn 0.00605 -0.0269 -0.0369 -0.0786 0.114** 0.188**
(0.0113) (0.0207) (0.0964) (0.131) (0.0564) (0.0743)
MP* Psuedoafter -0.0171 -0.0785** 0.399** -0.0823 -0.164* -0.222*
(0.0151) (0.0308) (0.158) (0.195) (0.0907) (0.122)
Psuedoafter*secondborn 0.00635 -0.0194 0.0469 0.00902 0.0743 0.154**
(0.0118) (0.0214) (0.100) (0.136) (0.0584) (0.0770)
MP* firstborn -0.000593 -0.0378 0.117 -0.0143 0.00479 0.0129
(0.0153) (0.0313) (0.160) (0.198) (0.0911) (0.123)
MP* secondborn -0.00270 -0.0476 0.173 -0.0236 0.0114 0.0541
(0.0161) (0.0327) (0.166) (0.207) (0.0947) (0.127)
Observations 267,465 267,465 242,749 264,535 267,465 267,465
Notes: This table shows the results for the schooling and math and reading scores for females
of birth cohorts 1993-2000, using specification (4). In this placebo test, I re-assign the policy to an
alternate year, such that birth cohorts from 1996-2000 become the affected cohort. Psuedoafter is the
policy year 1996. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 2
Spillover Effects of a Conditional
Cash Transfer Program on
Ineligibles: Evidence from India
2.1 Introduction
Policy interventions such as the conditional cash transfers (CCT) are likely to play an
important role in affecting the human capital development of all individuals in a family
with a treated child. The broad literature on program evaluation focuses mainly on the
own effects and not so much on the spillover effects on the ineligible siblings in a treated
family. In particular, little is known about the spillover effects of these programs on the
siblings in the same households, and their effect on decisons of intra-household resource
allocation. This paper estimates these indirect effects of the conditional cash transfer
program in India, Ladli Laxmi Yojana (LLY), on the education outcomes of ineligible
siblings, and studies the possible mechanisms through which these spillover effects occur.
The government of an Indian state, Madhya Pradesh (MP), introduced Ladli Laxmi
Yojana program on similar lines aimed at improving the education and health outcomes
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of girls through financial transfers. The program was announced in 2007 and is the
flagship conditional cash transfer program in the state. The program eligibility begins
right from the time of birth but it only covers the first or second born girls in a family.
The payments made are deferred until the girls enroll in grade 6 and are later made
upon meeting the different schooling levels. The biggest payment, however, comes at
age 21 and is given directly to the girl. This large payout is about twice the size of per
capita income of the state. This financial incentive is in the form of a longterm savings
bond redeemable on the daughters 21st birthday conditional on her being unmarried
until the age of 18 and completing school level education. This raises the issue of how
liquidity constrained households may respond to the program by possibly reallocating
the resources away from the ineligible sibling towards the eligible sibling. If this is the
case, the program will have negative effect on the human capital development of the
ineligible siblings. Another possibility can be that parents become more inclined to
educate all their children and the program has positive spillover effects on siblings.
Understanding the spillover effects of such a program and the plausible mechanisms
for these effects is important because of several reasons. First, the study of spillover
effects has implications for the design of such policies and programs. Second, this type
of program is now being implemented in other similar Indian states and therefore it is
important to evaluate both the own and indirect effects in terms of spillovers. Finally and
more broadly, this enables us to understand the preferences and changes in household
decision making that occur because of these programs.
This paper is the first to provide evidence on the spillover effects of Ladli Laxmi
Yojana in India. I assess the impact of LLY on the education outcomes, particularly
schooling outcomes and test scores, of older ineligible siblings of the treated girls. A
priori, the effect on the education outcomes of the ineligible children in the treated
families is unclear. For example, after the program, parents may be encouraged to
invest more in the overall human capital development of all of their children, which will
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lead to positive spillover effects of the program on all the children in a treated family.
On the contrary, given that the cash transfers and the big payout are conditional on the
girl completing different levels of schooling and eventually graduating from high school
by age 21, parents might divert resources away from the ineligible children towards the
eligible children. This will result in negative effects on the schooling outcomes of the
ineligible older siblings in the treated families. These two opposing stories imply that
the effect of such a program on the other ineligible children in treated families is an open
question.
The spillover effects of a conditional cash transfer program are not that widely dis-
cussed in the literature, and show both positive and negative spillover effects (Barrera-
Osorio et al., 2008; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006; Ferreira et al.,2009). To date, there
are only a few studies that look at the effects of CCTs in the Indian context (Anukriti,
2017; Sinha and Yoong, 2009). Most of these look at the effects of these programs on
the treated and not on the ineligibles. This study adds to the under-studied literature
on this topic by using a distinctive program: one that allows for variation in exposure
by state, birth cohort and birth order.
Using an individual level schooling and test scores data from a nationally representa-
tive household survey, Annual Status of Education Report (ASER), I exploit variation
in exposure across birth years, states, and birth order to estimate the effects of LLY on
the ineligible older siblings in a household. Employing a difference-in-differences frame-
work, I compare outcomes of ineligible older siblings of treated girls to older siblings of
non-treated girls in Madhya Pradesh and comparison states. I find that Ladli Laxmi
Yojana had no effect on the schooling outcomes of the older ineligible siblings. However,
there is some evidence of parents decreasing investments in the education of ineligible
siblings as I find evidence of reduced math and reading skills.
Using exogenous variation in the eligibility of the subset of eligible children in a
household, I can identify spillover effects in the schooling decisions among children who
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were ineligible older siblings of the program-eligible girls. The use of this natural exper-
imental design enables me to overcome the many challenges of identification problems
for this program’s impact. I define treatment in the following way, I treat children
with younger program-eligible sibling (or the second born sister) as treated and the
ones who do not have any eligible sibling as the comparison group in Madhya Pradesh
as the treated group. Then use the other five states, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa,
Rajasthan and Uttarakhand as comparison states.
The key dependent variables of interest are school enrollment, probability of staying
enrolled in school, grade progression, and math and reading test scores. Since, the effects
can also differ by the gender of the older sibling, I evaluate the results separately for the
two groups. My main findings are as follows: First, I find no evidence of a change in the
schooling outcomes of either the older ineligible sister or the brother. However,I find a
negative effect on math and reading skills of the ineligible older siblings. One possible
concern with the identification strategy is that there are other potential mechanisms
through which the ineligible siblings may have been affected. The focus of LLY was to
educate girls and improve their wellbeing by providing cash payments at different levels
of school completion. This would have induced behavioral changes among the households
with eligible girls along several dimensions, leading to the concern that the spillovers
can be due to peer effects or can be a behavioral response among the households with
program-eligible girls.
There are two possible explanations for the results I find. First, although I do not
find any evidence of change in school quality because of the program, I cannot com-
pletely rule out the hypothesis that LLY did not adversely affect that, as schools could
have become more crowded impacting the teacher quality or effort indirectly. Second
alternative interpretation for my findings is that the households with no eligible girls
may have responded positively to the information provided regarding the benefits of
attaining education. Additionally, if the program-eligible girls are in credit constrained
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households then the parents will most likely reallocate their resources away from inel-
igible siblings towards eligible girls. This will lead to an overall negative effect on the
schooling outcomes of the ineligible siblings of the eligible girls.
There are, however, several other hypotheses that can be rejected. I do not find
any evidence that the program affected eligible children’s health, which may have led to
better schooling outcomes. In a parallel study, (Jain, 2018) evaluating the own effects of
the program, I find that the positive effect on schooling outcomes of the eligible girls are
not driven by an improvement in their health. Additionally, there can be concerns about
differences in state specific trends in schooling outcomes, and therefore the results I find
are not the effect of the exposure to the program. Although, I have state and cohort
birth fixed effects, I add control for year-of-birth of the second born sister interacted
with that of the treated state.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the program; section 3
describes the data, and discusses the estimating equations, and identification strategy;
section 4 presents the main results; section 5 shows robustness checks and section 6
concludes.
2.2 Program Description
The government of Madhya Pradesh, one of India’s biggest, poorest, and most popu-
lous states, introduced a conditional cash transfer program, Ladli Laxmi Yojana. The
program was introduced with the intent to induce parents to invest in human capital
development of their daughters and promote well-being of girls. The program has var-
ious distinct characteristics that make it different in design from other CCT programs.
There are three main dimensions of variability in program eligibility that help identify
the effect of this program on the ineligible children in families with an eligible child.
The beneficiaries of the program are first and second born girls born on and after Jan-
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uary 1, 2006 in MP and in families with income less than the minimum taxable income
(annual household income less than Rs.250,000(USD 3800)). Therefore, the program
has variability with respect to gender, birth order and state. Another condition under
the program is that the parents agree to adopt a terminal method of family planning
(vasectomy or mastectomy) after the birth of second (birth order)daughter and before
enrolling her in the program. However, in a parallel study, (Jain, 2018) I find that this
condition was not implemented as design and most families continue to have three or
more children.
Under the program, the state government buys National Savings Certificates of
Rs.6000 each for the first five years of the life of the girl. These certificates are re-
deemable when the girl turn 21 for Rs.100,000. This is the biggest payment made under
the program is almost the double the amount of the per capita income of the state. How-
ever, the certificates are redeemable on meeting two conditions, the girl stays unmarried
until the legal age of 18 and completes schooling until grade 12. In order to further
induce schooling, the girl also receives a cash payment on enrolling at different levels of
schooling. She receives as sum of Rs. 2000 (USD 33) cash when she gets enrolled in the
6th grade, a sum of Rs. 4000 (USD 67) when she enrolls in the 9th grade and a sum of
Rs. 7500 (USD 125) when she enrolls in grade 11. The girls will also receive a monthly
allowance of Rs.200 (USD 3) in grades 11 and 12.
The main objectives of the scheme is to improve of the welfare of the girls, to increase
school enrollment, and discourage child marriage by subsidizing the cost of having a
daughter. While the program endows benefits for the eligible girl in the family, only
the first and second born girls are eligible under the program. Therefore, it is not
obvious that the program will benefit all the girls in a family. In terms of spillover
effects, since every child is not eligible under the program, parents may get inclined to
reallocate resources away from the ineligible children towards the eligible children. This
may especially be true in a credit constrained family, as in order to get the monetary
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benefits parents may be constrained to invest in just the eligible girl. Therefore, an
important research question is: what are the spillover effects of a CCT programs with
such an eligibility design?
2.3 Data and Identification Strategy
2.3.1 Data
I use the individual-level Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2009-14 to evaluate
the educational outcomes. The study uses all the five rounds of cross-sectional data
from these surveys that are nationwide, repeated cross sectional surveys, representative
at the state level. The survey covers nearly 700,000 rural children in age group 3-16
per year- those who are currently enrolled, have never been to school, or have dropped
out. In each rural district, 30 villages are sampled. In each village, 20 randomly selected
households are surveyed. All the children in a selected household, in the age group 5-16
are administered the same tests in basic reading and basic arithmetic.1
The usual age at which students enroll in school is 5 or 6. I use children aged 5-16 to
study the schooling and cognitive outcomes among the ineligible older siblings of eligible
girls. The ineligible birth cohorts are from 1993-2005 and the exposed birth cohorts are
from 2006-2009. I define ineligible sibling as just the first born before 2006 in a family
with second born program eligible girl born in 2006 or later.
The survey asks every child in a household, aged 5 and above, four questions each
in reading and math skills in their native or English language. For testing the math
skills, each child is asked questions on four math tasks. The tasks are whether the child
can recognize number 1-9; recognize numbers 10-99; can subtract; and can divide. The
math score is coded as 1 if the child correctly completes the tasks and 0 otherwise.
1ASER surveyors conduct the surveys on Sundays, when most people are at home and children are
not in school, and must return to households if the children are not present at the time of survey.
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Then I calculate the ”math score” which ranges from 0-4 and is the sum of scores of the
four questions asked to every child. The four reading questions are whether the child
can recognize letters; words; read a grade one text; and can read a grade two text. The
reading scores are coded as 1 if the child correctly answers each question and 0 otherwise.
Then I calculate the ”read score” which ranges from 0-4 and is the sum of scores of the
four reading questions. A read or math score of 0 implies that the child cannot read or
do any math and the score keeps increasing by one as the child can correctly reads or
solves the higher level of questions.
2.3.2 Estimating Equation
The objective of my empirical strategy is to assess the spillover effects of a conditional
cash transfer program, Ladli Laxmi Yojana in an Indian state, Madhya Pradesh on
educational outcomes of the ineligible siblings. I use a difference-in-differences framework
to study the effects of the policy on the ineligible older sibling in a household with a
program-eligible second born girl.
Since the program covered first and (or) second born girls born on or after January 1,
2006, I use the ineligible first born girls and boys born before 2006 with an eligible sister
born in 2006 or later as the treated group, and the first born children born in households
with no eligible sisters as the comparison group. That is, I define a treated child as the
one who is a first born in a family with a second born program-eligible girl. Using the
first born ineligible girls and boys before 2006 in MP, I employ a double difference by
using the other five backward states, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Odisha and
Rajasthan as the comparison group.
Thus, the difference-in-differences equation using the individual level data is:
Yihjt = β0+β1 ·(MPij ·Eligiblehhih)+β2 ·Eligiblehhih+δj +φt+γc+µX ′ihj +Uihjt (2.1)
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Yijh is the outcome variable for first born child i in eligible household h in state j at
time t. Since the policy was announced in 2007 for birth cohorts born from 2006, I define
eligible households,eligiblehh, as the one that has a first born child born before 2006 and
a second born girl born in 2006 or later. δj, φ[t], and γc are the state, year, and cohort
fixed effects. Sample includes birth cohorts born in years 1993-2005. X ′ijc is a vector
of individual and household characteristics controls,which includes mother’s age,and
mother’s education. β1 is the double difference estimator that estimates the spillover
effects of the policy on schooling and cognition outcomes of the ineligible children with
eligible sisters. The results from this specification are reported in the appendix.
In the above specification, by definition the treatment group is just the ineligible
first born children with a second born sister. On the other hand, the comparison group
will have ineligible first born children with both second born sister and second born
brother. The outcome variables can differ for the two group even without the program.
Additionally, the difference-in-differences estimator will give the causal effect of the
program if there were no differential trends in the outcomes, among MP and comparison
states. The identification strategy can be used to get the cohort-by-cohort analysis for
the outcome variables. Consider the following relationship between schooling outcomes
of an ineligible first born i, born in state j, in year t, in eligible household h, and his/her
exposure to the program:
Yihjt = β0 + β1l ·
17∑
l=1
(MPij · yobsisterit) + δj + φt + γc + µX ′ihj + Uihjt (2.2)
where yobsisterit is a dummy that indicates the year of the birth of the second born
sister. The sample consists of ineligible first born children in families with program-
eligible second born girls. Using the above specification, I measure the effect of exposure
to the program based on the year-of-birth of the second born sister. I measure the cohort
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variation (by the second sister’s year-of-birth) in schooling outcomes for the ineligible
older sibling with 17 year-of-birth dummies. Second born sisters born in 1994 form the
control group, and is omitted from the regression. Each coefficient β1n gives an estimate
of the impact of being an ineligible first born in a family with a second born girl. This
shows the effect on the ineligible children before and after the program. Children in
families with program-eligible sisters are exposed to the program as compared to the
ones whose second born sister was born before the program. In order for the parallel
trends assumption to hold, the coefficients should be zero or close to zero for the before
cohorts. Given that I find evidence of differential trends in outcomes between the treated
and comparison states, I add control for a linear trend using an interaction between
the year-of-birth of the second born sister and the treated state, MP. I can rewrite
specification (1) to control for the differential trends in outcomes as:
Yihjt = β0 + β1 · (MPij · Eligiblehhih) + β2 · Eligiblehhih + β3 · (MPij · yobsister)
+δj + φt + γc + µX
′
ihj + Uihjt (2.3)
where, MPij · yobsister is an interaction dummy between the year-of-birth of the
second sister and the MP dummy. Adding this interaction linearly controls for the
differential trends in the schooling and cognition outcome of the ineligible first born.
Additionally, the comparison group in this specification only consists of first born chil-
dren with a second born sister. This is the preferred specification and the results are
presented in the next section.
Before I present my results in the next section, a few points must be taken into
account. First, inference is based on robust standard errors. Second, I define treated
ineligible siblings as just the first born in a family with a second born eligible sister. This
is because the program was designed to also affect the fertility behavior of parents and
the birth of the third and later borns in these families could have been affected by it.
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Third, one of the eligibility conditions of LLY is that the family should be non- income
tax payers. I do not enforce this condition when defining eligibility in my analyses.
This is not a major concern as the number of income-tax payers in India is small due
to several tax exemptions.2 Moreover, tax evasion is widespread. For these reasons, it
is unlikely that the income-tax status of a household is a strictly enforced or a binding
condition for eligibility.
2.4 Results
In this section, I present the intent-to-treat reduced-form spillover effects of LLY on
schooling and cognition outcomes on ineligible children. Tables 2-7 show results for the
effect of exposure to the program on schooling outcomes using specification (3). Figures
1-6 plot the β1n from specification (2). Each point on the graph is the coefficient of
interaction between the treated state dummy and the year-of-birth of the second born
sister. These gives us the relationship between the birth cohort of the second sister and
the education outcomes of the first born children. I look at these separately for the
first born sister and first born brother. For the schooling outcomes, these coefficients
are increasing over time for both the highest grade completed and current grade for the
first born sister but likelihood of being currently enrolled and ever enrolled is almost
unchanged. For the older first born brother the effects are almost unchanged for all
the schooling outcomes, but current grade. The reading and math test scores have a
negative trend over the birth cohorts of the second sister, for both first born brother and
first born sister. Given these pre-existing negative trends between MP and comparison
states, I add a linear trend in the main specification to address the issue.
Tables 2 and 3 show the estimates of β1 from specification(3) using the ASER data
for schooling outcomes of both ineligible first born girl and boy, respectively. The birth
2Banerjee and Piketty (2005) show that incomes below the top 1 per cent are largely exempt from
taxation in India.
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cohorts of the ineligible first born are from 1993-2005. Column (1) shows the highest
grade completed by a child. This is the highest grade of schooling completed by the
child at the time of survey. It is zero if the child was never enrolled in schooled or if she
dropped out in grade 1, and for those who are currently enrolled, it is the current grade
minus 1. For the children who dropped out, highest grade completed is the grade in
which they dropped out minus one. In Table 2, columns (1)-(4) suggest that exposure to
the program did not have much effect on changing the schooling outcome of a first born
sister in a family with a second born program-eligible sister. The results are similar for
an ineligible first born brother. Although, for a family with a strong son preference, we
would expect the results to be different for older brothers and older sisters, the results
do not support the hypothesis.
The results in Tables 4-7 show the effect of the program on cognition skills of the
ineligible first born children. The coefficient for the over all math score is negative
for the ineligible older sister as compared to the positive coefficient for the ineligible
older brother. However, given a scale of 0-4 for the scores, both these coefficients are
relatively small and close to zero. The coefficient for reading scores is negative for both
ineligible older sister and brother. The results remain negative even after controlling for
the differential trend in scores between MP and comparison states, and are more
As a robustness check for the main results, I restrict my analyses to just 5-12 year
old children. This limits the oldest age group in the treated group to just 12 years and is
useful as the schooling effects can be quite different for much older children. I estimate
specification (3) using first born children aged 5-12 and drop households with older first
born children from the analyses. The results for this restricted age group are reported in
Tables 8-13. One of the concerns using much older group of children is that the dropout
rates are highest among the middle and higher secondary school going children. These
are usually in the age group of 13-17, and therefore I drop them from the analyses to
check if my main results are affected by this age group. My main results hold robust to
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excluding the older children from the analyses.
Therefore, I find suggestive evidence of no change in the schooling outcomes of the
ineligible first born children. However, I find evidence of change in math and reading
test scores. Comparing these results with the own-effect of the program on the test
scores, there is evidence of a negative effect on parental investments in their ineligible
children’s education outcomes, in terms of cognition skills. One reason for these results
is that in a credit constrained family, parents will try and divert resources towards
the program-eligible girl. This reallocation can be in terms of investing more in their
health, investing in terms of spending more time teaching and developing the skills of the
program-eligible girl to make sure that she completes the different levels of schooling and
eventually graduates from school. The results in the parallel study, (Jain, 2018) show
that there is positive increase in the test scores of the program-eligible girls. Therefore,
overall there is no evidence of spillover effects on the schooling outcomes of the ineligible
children. However, there is evidence of a negative spillover effect on the cognition skills
of the ineligible children, and is especially worse for the ineligible older sister.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the spillover effect of a conditional cash transfer program that differs
in design from most conventional CCT programs on the ineligible first born children in
households with a program-eligible second born sister.
The results suggest that the incentive of getting a huge financial payment in future
does not make parents reallocate resources away from the ineligible children. However,
I do find evidence of a negative spillover effect of the program on test scores of these
ineligible siblings. This is especially worse in case of an ineligible first born girl. It is
therefore possible that the program along with having a positive effects on the education
outcomes of the program-eligible girls, also had an unintended effect of inducing parents
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to reallocate some resources away from the ineligible children. This maybe particularly
true among the credit constrained households where the parents would be forced to divert
the available resources towards the human capital development of the program-eligible
girl.
There can be several reasons for these effects of the program. First, for the credit
constrained households to react positively to the program, parents maybe forced to re-
allocate resources away from the ineligible siblings. Second, I am only able to look at the
outcomes of children in rural areas and most rural areas have government schools. The
cost of sending a child to a government school in monetary terms is minimal. Therefore,
this might be a reason I do not find much evidence of change in schooling outcomes.
However, it can be costly to invest in the cognitive skill development of the children and
therefore, parents are induced to invest more in the program-eligible girl than in her
siblings, especially an ineligible sister. This in turn can result in unintended negative
spillover effect of the program on ineligible children. The program was designed to
empower and improve the well-being of girls in the state, and negative spillover effects
on the ineligible siblings will prove to be a impediment in achieving this objective. This
study shows the short-run spillover effects of this program on the ineligible children.
However, there can be difference in short run versus long run exposure to the program
on the ineligible siblings. ASER is expected to continue these annual surveys and hence
I expect to look at the long term exposure in the future.
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2.6 Figures
Figure 2.1: Cohort-specific Effects: Highest Grade Completed by the Ineligible
First Born
(a) Highest Grade Completed by the Older Ineligible Sister
(b) Highest Grade Completed by the Older Ineligible Brother
Notes: Author’s calculation of highest grade completed using the ASER data. This figure plots the
difference-in-differences coefficients of the interactions year-of-birth of the second born sister and Mad-
hya Pradesh (MP) dummies from equation (2). Birth cohort 1994 is the omitted reference group from
both the specifications.
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Figure 2.2: Cohort-specific Effects: Likelihood of Ever Enrolled by the Ineli-
gible First Born
(a) Likelihood of Ever Enrolled by the Older Ineligible Sister
(b) Likelihood of Ever Enrolled by the Older Ineligible Brother
Notes: Author’s calculation of likelihood of ever enrolled using the ASER data. This figure plots
the difference-in-differences coefficients of the interactions year-of-birth of the second born sister and
Madhya Pradesh (MP) dummies from equation (2). Birth cohort 1994 is the omitted reference group
from both the specifications.
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Figure 2.3: Cohort-specific Effects: Likelihood of Currently Enrolled by the
Ineligible First Born
(a) Likelihood of Currently Enrolled by the Older Ineligible Sister
(b) Likelihood of Currently Enrolled by the Older Ineligible Brother
Notes: Author’s calculation of likelihood of currently enrolled using the ASER data. This figure
plots the difference-in-differences coefficients of the interactions year-of-birth of the second born sister
and Madhya Pradesh (MP) dummies from equation (2). Birth cohort 1994 is the omitted reference
group from both the specifications.
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Figure 2.4: Cohort-specific Effects: Current Grade of the Ineligible First Born
(a) Current Grade of the Older Ineligible Sister
(b) Current Grade of the Older Ineligible Brother
Notes: Author’s calculation of the current grade using the ASER data. This figure plots the
difference-in-differences coefficients of the interactions year-of-birth of the second born sister and Mad-
hya Pradesh (MP) dummies from equation (2). Birth cohort 1994 is the omitted reference group from
both the specifications.
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Figure 2.5: Cohort-specific Effects: Math Score of the Ineligible First Born
(a) Math Score of the Older Ineligible Sister
(b) Math Score of the Older Ineligible Brother
Notes: Author’s calculation of the math score using the ASER data. This figure plots the difference-
in-differences coefficients of the interactions year-of-birth of the second born sister and Madhya Pradesh
(MP) dummies from equation (2). Birth cohort 1994 is the omitted reference group from both the
specifications.
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Figure 2.6: Cohort-specific Effects: Read Score of the Ineligible First Born
(a) Read Score of the Older Ineligible Sister
(b) Read Score of the Older Ineligible Brother
Notes: Author’s calculation of the read score using the ASER data. This figure plots the difference-in-
differences coefficients of the interactions year-of-birth of the second born sister and Madhya Pradesh
(MP) dummies from equation (2). Birth cohort 1994 is the omitted reference group from both the
specifications.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of key variables using ASER data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MP Obs. Non-MP Obs.
Panel A: Older Sister
Highest Grade Completed 3.89 7583 3.97 3032
(2.59) (2.50)
Ever Enrolled 0.98 7794 0.99 3108
(0.14) (0.11)
Currently Enrolled 0.92 7794 0.93 3108
( 0.28) (0.25)
Current Grade 4.95 7147 4.98 2901
(2.55) (2.46)
Math Score 2.33 6863 2.13 2753
(1.27) (1.26)
Read Score 2.70 6882 2.48 2761
(1.41) (1.41)
Panel A: Older Brother
Highest Grade Completed 4.08 8665 4.03 3670
(2.67) (2.64)
Ever Enrolled 0.99 8935 0.99 3762
(0.12) (0.10)
Currently Enrolled 0.93 8935 0.94 3762
(0.26) (0.24)
Current Grade 5.11 8295 5.03 3533
(2.64) (2.61)
Math Score 2.51 7655 2.41 3294
(1.27) (1.27)
Read Score 2.78 7699 2.69 3307
(1.36) (1.37)
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: Summary statistics for schooling outcome and control variables in Madhya Pradesh and compar-
ison states (Non-MP). Sample is the child-level data of first born children from birth cohorts 1993-2005
in households with program-eligible second born sister. Highest Grade Completed is the current grade
minus 1 for those who are currently attending school and dropout grade minus 1 for those who dropped
out. Also, if a child was never enrolled then, highest grade is coded as 0. Ever Enrolled is if the child
was (is) enrolled in a school. Currently attending school is a dummy if the child is currently enrolled
in school. Current grade is the grade in which the child is currently at.It is coded between 1 and 12.
Math score ranges from 0-4 and is the sum of scores for the four math questions (scored 1 or 0)- nothing;
numbers 1 to 9; numbers 10 to99; subtract and divide. Read score also ranges from 0-4 and is the sum
of four reading questions- nothing; letter; word; grade 1 text and grade 2 text. Standard deviation is
reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.2: Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older sister
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest grade completed Ever Enrolled Currently Enrolled Current Grade
Eligible hh*MP 0.0312 0.0202 0.00151 -0.00587
(0.0597) (0.0554) (0.00269) (0.00890)
Eligible hh -0.226*** -0.218*** -0.00306* 0.00365
(0.0291) (0.0261) (0.00168) (0.00439)
mp*yobsister 0.0202*** 0.0247*** -0.000302 0.000270
(0.00727) (0.00657) (0.000317) (0.00114)
Observations 24,918 23,840 25,304 25,304
State FE Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: The table shows result for schooling outcomes for ineligible older sisters of the eligible second
born.Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.3: Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older brother
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest grade completed Ever Enrolled Currently Enrolled Current Grade
Eligible hh*MP 0.0505 0.0233 -0.00348 0.00333
(0.0554) (0.0512) (0.00256) (0.00829)
Eligible hh -0.194*** -0.186*** 0.000709 0.000414
(0.0275) (0.0251) (0.00158) (0.00416)
mp*yobsister -0.000213 0.00465 0.000318 -0.00145
(0.00697) (0.00615) (0.000358) (0.00104)
Observations 26,605 25,636 27,017 27,017
State FE Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: The table shows result for schooling outcomes for ineligible older brothers of the eligible sec-
ond born.Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Math test scores of the ineligible older sister
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Score Nothing Numbers 1to9 Numbers 10to99 Subtract Divide
Eligible hh*MP -0.0698 0.0165* 0.0272* -0.00329 -0.0714*** 0.0309
(0.0450) (0.00862) (0.0160) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0192)
Eligible hh -0.0123 -0.000922 0.0232*** -0.0124 -0.0290*** 0.0190*
(0.0218) (0.00356) (0.00676) (0.00919) (0.00949) (0.00982)
mp*yobsister -0.0198*** -0.000459 0.00253** 0.00546*** 0.00311 -0.0106***
(0.00431) (0.000641) (0.00123) (0.00168) (0.00200) (0.00210)
Observations 22,730 22,730 22,730 22,730 22,730 22,730
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the math test scores for ineligible sisters of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Math test scores of the ineligible older brother
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Score Nothing Numbers 1to9 Numbers 10to99 Subtract Divide
Eligible hh*MP 0.00249 -0.00405 0.0366*** -0.0142 -0.0676*** 0.0493***
(0.0421) (0.00786) (0.0140) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0184)
Eligible hh -0.0337* 0.00896*** 0.0105* -0.000654 -0.0325*** 0.0136
(0.0203) (0.00345) (0.00607) (0.00825) (0.00892) (0.00925)
mp*yobsister -0.0231*** 0.000521 0.00166 0.00706*** 0.00187 -0.0111***
(0.00407) (0.000638) (0.00107) (0.00155) (0.00183) (0.00199)
Observations 23,917 23,917 23,917 23,917 23,917 23,917
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the math test scores for ineligible brothers of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Read test scores of the ineligible older sister
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Read Score Nothing Letter Word Grade 1 Text Grade 2 Text
Eligible hh*MP -0.132*** 0.0104 0.0253* 0.0128 -0.0108 -0.0377*
(0.0478) (0.00846) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0197)
Eligible hh -0.00194 -0.00268 0.0151** -0.00552 -0.0217*** 0.0148
(0.0213) (0.00363) (0.00606) (0.00668) (0.00762) (0.00929)
mp*yobsister -0.0140*** -0.000460 0.00327*** 0.00200* 0.00208 -0.00689***
(0.00418) (0.000675) (0.00110) (0.00117) (0.00154) (0.00188)
Observations 22,786 22,786 22,786 22,786 22,786 22,786
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the read test scores for ineligible sisters of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Read test scores of the ineligible older brother
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Read Score Nothing Letter Word Grade 1 Text Grade 2 Text
Eligible hh*MP -0.0689 0.000997 0.0355*** -0.00960 -0.0223 -0.00456
(0.0431) (0.00768) (0.0133) (0.0142) (0.0160) (0.0184)
Eligible hh -0.0251 0.0121*** 0.00470 -0.0136** -0.0101 0.00695
(0.0202) (0.00336) (0.00584) (0.00654) (0.00743) (0.00888)
mp*yobsister -0.0147*** 4.37e-05 0.00149 0.00394*** 0.00218 -0.00766***
(0.00387) (0.000623) (0.000988) (0.00118) (0.00149) (0.00180)
Observations 23,988 23,988 23,988 23,988 23,988 23,988
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the read test scores for ineligible brothers of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older sister, aged 5-12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest grade completed Ever Enrolled Currently Enrolled Current Grade
Eligible hh*MP 0.0734 0.0351 0.00304 -0.000101
(0.0622) (0.0591) (0.00276) (0.00961)
Eligible hh -0.183*** -0.167*** -0.00279 -0.00502
(0.0274) (0.0252) (0.00176) (0.00450)
mp*yobsister 0.00820 0.0145* -0.000157 0.000273
(0.00923) (0.00865) (0.000343) (0.00155)
Observations 17,842 17,337 18,140 18,140
State FE Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: The table shows result for schooling outcomes for ineligible older sisters of the eligible second
born.Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.9: Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older brother, aged 5-12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest grade completed Ever Enrolled Currently Enrolled Current Grade
Eligible hh*MP 0.0660 0.0568 -0.00215 -0.00624
(0.0588) (0.0567) (0.00245) (0.00884)
Eligible hh -0.165*** -0.171*** 0.00242 0.000568
(0.0276) (0.0265) (0.00151) (0.00406)
mp*yobsister -0.00827 -0.00271 -0.000376 0.000230
(0.00911) (0.00865) (0.000394) (0.00138)
Observations 18,547 18,150 18,852 18,852
State FE Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: The table shows result for schooling outcomes for ineligible older brothers of the eligible sec-
ond born.Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Math test scores of the ineligible older sister, aged 5-12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Score Nothing Numbers 1to9 Numbers 10to99 Subtract Divide
Eligible hh*MP -0.0229 0.0201* 0.0148 -0.0126 -0.0769*** 0.0545**
(0.0554) (0.0105) (0.0197) (0.0247) (0.0241) (0.0233)
Eligible hh 5.19e-05 -0.00268 0.0183** -0.0152 -0.0138 0.0134
(0.0248) (0.00406) (0.00782) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0110)
mp*yobsister -0.0320*** -0.00111 0.00535** 0.00792** 0.00457 -0.0167***
(0.00779) (0.00122) (0.00232) (0.00326) (0.00354) (0.00366)
Observations 16,068 16,068 16,068 16,068 16,068 16,068
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the math test scores for ineligible sisters of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.11: Math test scores of the ineligible older brother, aged 5-12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Score Nothing Numbers 1to9 Numbers 10to99 Subtract Divide
Eligible hh*MP 0.0310 -0.00884 0.0393** -0.0327 -0.0481** 0.0504**
(0.0532) (0.00985) (0.0178) (0.0236) (0.0233) (0.0233)
Eligible hh -0.0419* 0.0103** 0.00805 -0.00106 -0.0211** 0.00391
(0.0239) (0.00418) (0.00724) (0.00988) (0.0104) (0.0107)
mp*yobsister -0.0260*** 0.00123 0.00186 0.00982*** -0.00417 -0.00874**
(0.00764) (0.00120) (0.00213) (0.00316) (0.00354) (0.00373)
Observations 16,339 16,339 16,339 16,339 16,339 16,339
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the math test scores for ineligible brothers of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.12: Read test scores of the ineligible older sister, aged 5-12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Read Score Nothing Letter Word Grade 1 Text Grade 2 Text
Eligible hh*MP -0.113* 0.0105 0.0181 0.00978 -0.00228 -0.0360
(0.0594) (0.0105) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0206) (0.0244)
Eligible hh 0.0160 -0.00461 0.0127* -0.00736 -0.0209** 0.0202*
(0.0246) (0.00422) (0.00702) (0.00769) (0.00877) (0.0106)
mp*yobsister -0.0192** -0.000553 0.00545** 0.00273 -0.000347 -0.00727**
(0.00780) (0.00127) (0.00215) (0.00223) (0.00279) (0.00342)
Observations 16,103 16,103 16,103 16,103 16,103 16,103
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the read test scores for ineligible sisters of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.13: Read test scores of the ineligible older brother, aged 5-12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Read Score Nothing Letter Word Grade 1 Text Grade 2 Text
Eligible hh*MP -0.0186 -0.00516 0.0371** -0.0277 -0.0167 0.0124
(0.0543) (0.00944) (0.0169) (0.0184) (0.0206) (0.0235)
Eligible hh -0.0182 0.0131*** -0.000502 -0.0135* -0.00577 0.00664
(0.0238) (0.00401) (0.00695) (0.00782) (0.00874) (0.0104)
mp*yobsister -0.0280*** 0.00131 0.00226 0.00745*** 0.00107 -0.0121***
(0.00727) (0.00117) (0.00196) (0.00230) (0.00288) (0.00341)
Observations 16,397 16,397 16,397 16,397 16,397 16,397
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the read test scores for ineligible brothers of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.8 Appendix
Table A1: Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older sister
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest grade completed Ever Enrolled Currently Enrolled Current Grade
Eligible hh*MP 0.126*** 0.131*** -0.000778 0.000234
(0.0404) (0.0374) (0.00202) (0.00635)
Eligible hh -0.145*** -0.137*** -0.00133 -0.00142
(0.0224) (0.0204) (0.00136) (0.00360)
Observations 55,569 53,415 56,634 56,634
State FE Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: The table shows result for schooling outcomes for ineligible older sisters of the eligible second
born.Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A2: Schooling outcomes of the ineligible older brother
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest grade completed Ever Enrolled Currently Enrolled Current Grade
Eligible hh*MP 0.00210 0.00533 -0.00108 -0.00262
(0.0365) (0.0348) (0.00197) (0.00584)
Eligible hh -0.101*** -0.0948*** 0.000583 -0.000159
(0.0214) (0.0198) (0.00118) (0.00343)
Observations 61,381 59,252 62,627 62,627
State FE Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: The table shows result for schooling outcomes for ineligible older brothers of the eligible sec-
ond born.Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3: Math test scores of the ineligible older sister
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Score Nothing Numbers 1to9 Numbers 10to99 Subtract Divide
Eligible hh*MP -0.126*** 0.0136* 0.0307** 0.0118 -0.0441*** -0.0120
(0.0333) (0.00724) (0.0131) (0.0153) (0.0139) (0.0131)
Eligible hh -0.0442** -0.000899 0.0185*** 0.00503 -0.0179** -0.00479
(0.0186) (0.00349) (0.00641) (0.00799) (0.00785) (0.00777)
Observations 50,649 50,649 50,649 50,649 50,649 50,649
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the math test scores for ineligible sisters of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A4: Math test scores of the ineligible older brother
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Score Nothing Numbers 1to9 Numbers 10to99 Subtract Divide
Eligible hh*MP -0.107*** -0.00172 0.0396*** 0.0212 -0.0471*** -0.0119
(0.0317) (0.00667) (0.0114) (0.0139) (0.0128) (0.0126)
Eligible hh -0.0255 0.00653* 0.00333 -0.00193 -0.00678 -0.00115
(0.0176) (0.00352) (0.00578) (0.00737) (0.00743) (0.00741)
Observations 54,877 54,877 54,877 54,877 54,877 54,877
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the math test scores for ineligible brothers of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5: Read test scores of the ineligible older sister
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Read Score Nothing Letter Word Grade 1 Text Grade 2 Text
Eligible hh*MP -0.160*** 0.00598 0.0342*** 0.0161 0.00109 -0.0574***
(0.0371) (0.00698) (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0145)
Eligible hh -0.0353* -0.00241 0.0113* 0.00949 -0.00795 -0.0104
(0.0190) (0.00355) (0.00579) (0.00606) (0.00638) (0.00791)
Observations 50,788 50,788 50,788 50,788 50,788 50,788
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the read test scores for ineligible sisters of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A6: Read test scores of the ineligible older brother
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Read Score Nothing Letter Word Grade 1 Text Grade 2 Text
Eligible hh*MP -0.117*** 0.00126 0.0334*** 0.00962 -0.00787 -0.0364***
(0.0343) (0.00680) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0135)
Eligible hh -0.00850 0.00742** -0.00465 -0.00320 -0.000838 0.00127
(0.0184) (0.00352) (0.00553) (0.00586) (0.00640) (0.00760)
Observations 55,012 55,012 55,012 55,012 55,012 55,012
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Source: ASER 2009-2014
Notes: This table shows the results for the read test scores for ineligible brothers of eligible second
born females. Controls include mother’s age and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix A
Data Appendix
A.1 Civil Registration System Data
The dataset is the official state panel data on registered births. I use data from 2001-
2015. Given that the program was announced in April, 2007, I define After as birth
cohorts born from 2007 onwards. This data has information on registered births for
births that took place in the given year and were registered in that year itself. Therefore
for a given year, there is no record of the births that took place in previous years and
got registered in that year. Following is the list and description of variables I use in the
analysis using this dataset.
Table A1: Variable Description
Variables Description
Female Share Authors calculation of share of female births in total registered births
Sex Ratio Authors calculation of total female births divided by total male births
98
A.2 India Human Development Survey, 2011-12
The dataset is a household survey data for year 2011-12. It has information on child
birth history of all the surveyed ever married women. I use information on gender of
the children- both the ones that are alive and those who had died by the time of the
survey. This helps me generate sex ratio at birth for all the births. These are also-
both registered and unregistered births. For the fertility preference of the parents I use
information on the total number of children women have by the time of survey and from
what year did they start having children. I also have information on the gender of the
children. Finally, I also use information on sterilization. For the fertility outcomes I am
only including women with at leaat one child by the time of survey.
Table A2: Variable Description
Variables Description
Sex ratio at birth Ratio of female to male child birth-
both those who died and were alive by the time of survey
Eligible Case1 Woman dummy variable: is a woman who has no children by the year 2005
Eligible Case2 woman dummy variable: is a woman who has one children by the year 2005
Sterilization dummy variable: either the woman or her husband has adopted sterilization as a method
of family planning by the time of survey
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A.3 Annual Status of Education Report, 2009-14
This is a household survey of yearly cross-section data from 2009 to 2014. This survey is
conducted only in the rural areas and has information on schooling outcomes and math
and reading test scores of children. In a surveyed household, every child aged 3-16 is
included in the survey. Every child aged 5-16 is surveyed and even those who are not in
school, i.e, they either dropped out or were never enrolled in the school are also included.
Table A3: Variable Description
Variables Description
Highest Grade Completed is the current grade minus 1 for those who are currently attending school
and dropout grade minus 1 for those who dropped out. Also, if a child was
never enrolled then, highest grade is coded as 0.
Current Grade dummy variable: only defined for the ones who are currently
enrolled in a grade in school
Ever Enrolled dummy variable:if the child was ever enrolled in the school
Currently Enrolled dummy variable: if the child is enrolled in the school
Math Score ranges from 0-4 and is the sum of scores for the
four math questions (scored 1 or 0)- nothing; numbers 1 to 9;
numbers 10 to99; subtract and divide.
Read score ranges from 0-4 and is the sum of four reading
questions (scored 0 or 1)- nothing; letter; word;
grade 1 text and grade 2 text.
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